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PE 80..082/fin..The foLlowing motions for resolution were referred to the PoLitical Affairs
omm i t tee by p l en a r y at ; t 5 S; t t ; n  9 s on:
...
9 March 1981 , the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SCHALL and others on
European political cooperation on matters of 'security policy (Doc. 1-931/80)
...
13 March 1981 , the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr LOMAS and others on
peace and secur; ty (Doc. 1-30/81)
16 September 1981 , the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SCHALL and others,
on the two-part NATO decision (Doce 1-497/81)
16 November 1981 , the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EFREMIDIS and others,
on the European Part iament' s support for the Member States of the EEC in the; 
endeavours for peace (Doc~ 1-700/81)
18 November 1981 , the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs GAIOTTI de BlASE and
others , on balanced and controlled disarmament (Daco 1-760/81)
18 November 1981 , the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs LIZIN and others, on
peace in Europe (Doc ~ 1-766/81) 
18 December 1981 , the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE and others, on
the USA-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva (Daca 1-904/81)
15 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabLed by Mr VAN AERSSEN, and others
on the violation of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine CDoco 1-784/81)
14 June 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EPHREDEMIS and others on the
second UN Special Session on Disarmament (Doc~ 1-268/82) 
At its meeting of 21-23 April 1981 , the PoLitical Affairs Committee decided to draw
up a report on European Po lit i ca L Cooperat i on and European Secur; ty 
At its meet i ng of 13 May 1981 , Mr HAAGERUP was appo; nted rapporteur 
The Political Affairs Committee considered the draft report at its meetings of
22-24 Sept embe r 1982 and 3 Novembe r 1982 
At the Last meeting it adopted the motion for a resoLution as a whole by 33 votes
to 5 with 4 abstentions.
2-- 3 - PE 80& O82/firThe foLlowing took part ;n the vote:
Mr Rumor, cha; rman; Mr Haagerup, 'f; rst vi ce-chai rman and rapporteur; Mr Fergusson,
third vice-chairman; Mr Antoniozzi, Mr Balfe (deputizing for Mr Lomas), Mr Barbi,
Mr Battersby (deput i zing for Lord Douro), Mr Berkhouwer, Lord Bethe  L, Mr Bett i za,
Mr Den;au (deputizing for Mr Lalor), Mr Deschamps, Mr Ephremidis, Mr FeLlermaier
(deput i zing for Mr B. F r i  edri ch), Mr Gawronsk i (deput i zing for Mr Donnez),
Mr Habsburg, Mr Hansch, Mrs Hammerich, Mr van Hassel, Mrs van den Heuvel, Mr Jaquet,
Mr Klepsch, Mr Kyrkos (deputizing for Mr Piquet)  Mr Langes (deputizing for Mr Bourn;as),
Mrs Macciocchi (deputizing for Mr CarigL ia) ~ Mr de La MaLene, Mr d' Ormesson
(deputizing for Mr Diligent), Mr' Paisley (deputizing for Mr Romuald;) , Mr Pelikan
(deputizing for Mrs GredaL) p Mr Penders, Mr Plaskovitis, Mr Price (deputizing for
Lord O' Hagan), Mr Ripa di Meana (deputizing for Mr van Miert) , Mr SchalL, Mr SchieLer
Mr Segre, Mr' Ja Ma TayLor (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mrs Theobald-Paoli (deputizing
for Mr Mot chane), Mr Turner Cdeput i zi ng for Sir James Scott-Hopk ins), Mr Wa  ter
Cdeput i z; ng for Mr Brandt) , Mr Wawrz i k (deput; zing for Mrs Lenz) , Mr Zagar;.
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PE 80.082/fin..The PoLiticaL Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament
the following motion for a resoLution, together with expLanatory statement.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on European Security and European PoLitical Cooperation
The European Parliament
confident of the contribution which the Member States of the European
Community can make to international peace and stab;  ity by acting 
un; son,
caLling for a European peace and security policy which aims at stabiLizing
East-West re Lat ions and promot; ng detente, a const ruct i ve North-South
dialogue and effective crisis management,
recognising that questions related to European Security are not the
exc Lus i ve concern of Member States, but of vi ta L importance to aLL the
signatories of the HeLsinki FinaL Act,
grave Ly di sturbed by the cant i nued i nc rease in the number of nuc Lear
weapons in the world and by the vast amount of money spent on these and
on ever more sophisticated conventional weapons,
associating itseLf with the preoccupation of the peopLes of the Community
with both European and globaL security problems,
un d e r s tan din 9 the wid e s pre a d con  ern w i' t h the t h rea t a f n u c lea r war
expressed by way of demonst rat ions , mass meet i ngs, books, pamph lets and
pet i t ion s
whereas adequate defence measures and arms control are two sides of the
same coin: a balanced security policy designed to prevent war and not
mereLy nucLear war
deploring the lack of progress in disarmament and arms control negotiations
- 5- PE 80~O82/fin.expressing its support for the ongoing arms control and arms reduction talks
dealing with Intermediate Nuclear Forces CINF) p Strategic Arms Reduction
(START) , and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions CMBFR) in the hope that they
wi II ensure European and gLobal peace and security and reduce the vast arms
arsenal of the super-powers and others
convinced that arms control negotiations between East and West are important
for both sides, that they should take the form of a continuous process and
that they should be aimed at mutual security based on balanced military rel-
ations at the Lowest possible arms Level
recommending continued close consultations within European PoLiticaL Cooperation
CEPC) for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
having regard to the importance of measures to promote genuine trust as a pre-
requi site for and camp Lement to ba lanced arms reduct; on in both East and West,
recognising that ; whi Le the European Community and its institutions have no
explicit responsibility for defence and military security, the ParLiament can
di scuss any matter that seems to it relevant
reaL izing the impossibi l ity of separating a large number of foreign policy issues
of vital interest to Europe from their direct or indirect security impLications,
taking into account , that the concept or European peace and security goes beyond
those issues which are related to mi litary defence and embraces non-mi Litary
aspects of security such as the furtherance of globaL peace and stabi Ltity,
international order and the protection of world trade
supporting the decision by the governments of the Ten to incLude questions related
p 0 Lit i c a L see u r i t Y i n th e i r' deL i be  rat ion s an d con s u l tat ion s wit h i n th e con t e x t
of European Po lit i c a l Cooperat i Gn
convinced that a new war in Europe is not the solution to our poLiticaL problems
and that a nuclear war would resuLt in the destruction of European civilization,
concerned that in recent times there has been an increasing tendency to solve
poLiticaL problems between states using war as an instrument of policy,
recognising that peace is aLso threatened by economic crises and that worldwide
ten s ion s are i  ere a sed w 11 en , a s in PoL and, the pop u l a t ion and par tic u l a r l y the
working popuLation are denied the right to participate in the construction 
a free and just orde r
- 6 - PE 80.082/f;n8having regard to the folLowing motions for resoLutions presented by:
Mr SCHALL and others, on behalf of the Group of European PeopLe s Party
(Christian Democrat Group) , on European politicaL cooperation on matters
of security policy (DOCe 1-931/80),
Mr LOMAS and others, on peace and detente (Doc Q 1-30/81)
Mr SCHALL and others, on behal f of the Group of the European People s Party
(Christian Democratic Group) , on the two-part NATO decision (Doce1-497/81),
Mr EFREMIDIS and others, on the European Parl iament r s support for the Member
States of the EEC in thei r endeavours for peace (Doc 0 1-700/81)
Mrs GAIOTTI DE BlASE and others, an behal f of the Group of the European
People s Party (CD Group) , on balanced and controLled disarmament (DoCQ 1-760/81:
Mrs LIZIN and others, on peace in Europe (Doc~ 1-766/81)
Mr GLINNE and others, on behalf of the Socialist Group, on the USA-USSR
disarmament negotiations in Geneva (Docm 1-904/81)
Mr VAN AERSSEN and others, on behal f of the Group of the European PeopLe
Party, on the vioLation of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine
(DaCa 1-784/81)
Mr EPHREMIDIS and others, on the second UN SpeciaL Session on Disarmament
(Doc~ 1-268/82)
having regard the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc~ 1-946/82)
States as its conviction that~
1 . The Member States of the European Community share a number of vital security
concerns even if the Community has no military dimension of its own;
2 a These shared security concerns shouLd be fully explored and eLaborated,
particularLy within the context of EPC, in order to give substance to and
rea l i ze a t rue European peace and seGur i ty concept and to promote the
seGur i ty of aLL European peep leg;
~ -
Efforts should be made to bring about a wider understanding by the public,
poLitical parties and governments of the many diverse elements which
contribute to the evoLving European security conceptp without infringing
the rights and responsibilities of national governments in defence matters;
- 7 -
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8. -
The European Parliament can play a significant roLe in bringing about
such an understanding by its active and growing participation 
European Political Cooperation, by identifying and debating common
European security concerns and by arranging hearings and seminars
on secur; ty-re lated issues;
As all present and .probab le Communi ty Member States but one a re members
of the Atlantic Alliance, it is urged that a more effective co-ordinatio
take place between the political consultations in EPC and NATO respectiv
Consultations ;n EPC must not negate political consultations within the
Atlantic Alliance but should on the contrary strengthen such consultatio
Whi le efforts to sustain close relations and intimate cooperation with
the Uni ted States and Canada as a vita l element of European securi ty sho
be maintained and, if possible, further increased, improvements should b
sought in the East-West reLationship in Europe in full compLiance with 
on the basis of the HeLsinki Declaration of 1975 with the aim of reducin
existing tensions and enlarging the scope and the roLe played by the CSC
process;
Increased competition in the fields of armaments constitutes a grave th~
to security and peace in Europe, and so the voi ces of the peace movement
whi ch have spoken out in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the USA agai
the growing arms race and the admonitions and warning coming from Christ
churches are of great importance;
Instructs its President to forward this resoLution to the Counci L , the
Commission, the ten Community Member Governments and the Governments of
Spain and PortugaL , and further to the Governments of the United States
tanada, Norway, I ce l~nd, and Turkey.
- 8 - PE 80~ O82/1EXP LANA TORY S T  TEMENT
EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION AND EUROPRAN- SECURITY.
------------.... ----- - ---- -- - --.... --------- ---------------- ------------------ -- -------------- - - - -- --------------
Introduction 
Why has i t been deemed useful to have a
report on EPC and European security? It is a well-
known fact tha t the Communi ty has no legal competence
in the field of defence and secur i ty and that no one
commissioner has been specifically "a1??Oin-t.ed fo~ these areas.
The Trea ty of Rome has no clauses dealing wi th secur i ty
and there has been no full-scale attempt to broaden
the scope of the Communi ty to include defence since
the signing of the Trea ty of Rome.
The reason for a report dealing wi th European
secur i ty is manifold  European Poli tical Co-opera tion,
which has developed rapidly over the last ten YGars,
puts increasing emphasis on secur i ty aspects of foreign
policy issues  The reason for this stems no~
f~om  preoccupation with security issues as such,
but from the increased tensions in the. world (and not onlr
wi thin the tradi tional East/West cold war context . thus
the growing disorder which is noticeable in several
regions of the world have made it inevi table that
secur i ty concerns have come to play a growing role 
It is an indisputable fact that attempts to
maintain or secu~e world order fail more often
than they succeed and that developments in var ious
parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and notably
the Middle East, have left the impression that world
order  lJ  insofar it ever existed f is crumbling 
A second reason for a repor t on European
secur i ty is the growing interest in arms control and
disarmament and the widespread opposi tion to any in-
crease of the nuclear weapons arsenals and to a further
proliferation of nuclear weapons  This interest
ar ises again from the growing feeling of insecur i ty,
which has to do wi th the increased international ten-
sions and growing disorder  but it is also a sign of a
cer tain impa tienc€ wi th tpe presen t secur i ty system
- 9 - PE 80  082 1 f; n in Europe~ aLthQugh it has managed tp keep peac~. in OU~
continent for more than 35 yearsQ
Furthermore, there is undoubtedly a need to
sort out the issues and explain the problems and terms
used in the deba te dealing wi th both war ld secur i ty
and European secur i ty  The London repor t of November
1981 on European Poli tical Co-operation made, for the first time, a reference to security by officia~ly accept-
ing the need to discuss the poli tical aspects of secur ity
among .the Foreign Ministers of the Ten 0 But where is the
border line between defence and secur i ty? One of the
underlying motives for this report is to make an attempt
to differentia te between such commonly used terms as
secur i ty, defence, arms control and disarmament.
The emphasis will not be on the str ictly
mili tary aspects of secur i ty  which are the responsibili-
ty of national governments and for the mili tary alliance
- the Atlantic Alliance - to which aL L the Member States
0 f the Com m u ni t y but one beL a n 9 ~ Howe v e r , see u r. i t Y
is a much more comprehensive concept than just a policy
concerned wi th the purely mili tary aspects of secur i ty 
It is a fact that some poli tical and economic decisions
by Member  ta tes and by the Communi ty often have
obvious secur i ty impl ica tions 
Such decisions f therefore f inevi tably lead
to a more identifiable European concept of secur i ty
d~termined by those concerns which are shared by the
t~n Member States, irrespective of their membership
or non-member ship o the A tlan tic Alliance 
It is the task o this report to br iefly
trace these developments to ascer tain how and why they lead to a concept of European security"
This will also expla n why the report makes no
recommendation as to the setting~up of new insti tutions
in the immediate fu ture to deal with the vital securi 
concerns of the Member Sta tes of the Communi ty~ Such
concerns will for the time be ing have to be deal t wi th by the Member
States and by the Community within the cGntext of existing institutions, though it is obv ious that the growing
1 0  PE 80  082 / fin European identity of interests will necessar ily mean
that both governments and Communi ty insti tutions may
consider new ways of dealing wi th many international
problems 
Unlike most other reports on European secur i ty,
this report deals primarily with the present and the
immedia te future ~ It is not a bluepr int for how a
. future European defence community can and should look
and it is not. recommending policies and steps which
are only realizable in a European context more advanced
. and very different from the present Community and
EPC structure 
The rapporteur recognizes that the future
may hold sever al options for closer European co-oper 
tion not only on broad secur i ty problems but also on
specific and general defence issues 0 If, how and when
they are to be brought about is beyond the scope of
this report, which focuses primarily on the present
needs and current problems, insofar as European
Political Co-Operation and European security are
conce r ned 
- 1 1 - PE 80tJ O82/fin..EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT.
---------------------- - ---- --  -- ------- ------------ ------- --------------- - - - -- -- - -- -- --- -- -- - ---------
The secur i ty environment of Europe
the rest of the world, characterized by the
of a destructi ve potential far super ior to
anything in history& The destructive capability of
exis ting arms ar senals could conce i vably do away wi 
civilisation and kill all mankind, maybe even ten 
twenty times over. It is a situation which is some
times referred to as overkill capaci ty, which is to
be explained by the enormous mili tary nuclear power
available t~ above al~ the two super-powers, but also 
thr~(:. other and potentiq.lly more na tions for purposes of
war.
is, like
existence
It is often alleged that this overkill ~apaci 
is in itself a highly destabilizing factor, which
could lead to outbreak of war  This is by
no means certain~ wi thout going to the other extreme
and simply stating that there is  safety in numbers 
g -
a statement not wholly without truth - the staggering
number of nuclear warheads and other destructi ve means
may not proper tionally increase the danger of war
However f they are cer tainly evidence of an enormous
waste  because there is no agreement between the
super~powers or, for that matter  among other nations
as to what is enougho To define what would be enough
to deter a future global war is a principal objective
of the cur rent START talks (former ly SALT) 
On the whole  the existence of nuclear weapons
since 1945 has played an important, maybe decisive,
role in preventing a ne1.q Vlor Id 'llar,,-  0;:1 the other hand, they
have by no means contr ibuted to a more satisfactory
international world order On the contrary, the
war Id scene is marked by increased violence and dis-
order  There is no generally accepted international
system of war Id order and secur i ty 
The United Nations, in spite of its qlobal mernbershiD, has 
no way become strong enough to form the basis of
such a systern0
1 2  PE 80" 0 82  fin The emergence In the post-war ~ra  ot  two
super-powers, which today remain by far the strongest
powers, was the basis of the so-called system of bi-
polar i ty  It undoubtedly lent the international
system a certain stability~ But even that element
is gradually being .erodede The regional securi~y
system in Europe continues to provide for a considerable
element of secur i ty 8 so far as the danger of open
mili tary conflict between East and West is concerned.
But outside Europe it is becoming increasingly evident
that 'the super-powers are less and less able t9 influence
events to the extent that they were, say, 15-20 years ago.
Wars and other fo~ms of armed conflicts in South-East
. . ' . , .
Asia ~ in the Middle East, in Africa, and ln Latln
America testify to this development 
As far as Western European secur i ty is concerned
it. continues to be closely linked to Nor th Amer iea and
the Uni ted Sta tes nuclear guar antee of European secur i ty.
This is a state of affairs which nei ther the Uni ted
States and Canada on the one hand, nor the Western
European Member States of the Atlantic Alliance on
the othe~ wish to see brought to an end  However,
the Atlantic Alliance is becoming burdened wi th 
increasing number of problems, par tly but not wholly
in consequence of the economic cr isis, the rising
number of unemployed, and unsatisfactory economic
growth  Foreign policy perceptions differ between
Washington and European capitals, and if divergencies
across the Atlantic should ser iously threa ten the credibili ty of Atlantic cohesion it could have
harmful and maybe fatal consequences for European s~~iq.
Not only European economic well~being but
also European secur i ty depend on the continued access
to oil and to a number of minerals  However, these are
often to be found only in legions of potential instability
nd th0.Y will normally hAve to be tr nsported to Europe
by way of sea lanes that would be d~ngerous ly exposed by
local conflicts and by the threat ~f ~ wider conflict.
PE 80 to 082 / fin ...
Dur ing the last few years, popular expressions
of opposi tion to nuclear weapons and indeed to a
continued policy of armed defence are coming to. play
an important role in a number of Western European
countr ies iii Irrespective of the sincere desires for peace such manifestations reflect they
couLd mean a serious threat to European security, insofar as volati Le pubL;c opinion may make
it more difficult, if not impossible, one day to main-
tain an adequa te defence posture. The rise of the
peace movements and the large scale anti-nuclear weapon
rallies in several European ci ties indicate the diffi-
culties inherent in implementing policies of nuclear
weapons deployment or increased defence expendi ture 
This is of special significance in light of
the so-called. double decision taken by the NATO Council
in December 1979 to deploy 572 Pershing II and Cruise
Missiles from 1983 onwards. The other par t of the
double decision was made with the aim of opening discussions with the
Soviet Union on In termedia te Range Nuclear Weapons
(INF) , and it was before these negotiations were started
on November 30, 1981, that most large scale anti-nucl~ar rallties
took place in several European ci ties. If the negotia-
tions should fail to br ing about the desired and
hoped for resul ts such rallies may occur again and
could make it poLiticaLl'y difficult to impLement the decision to
deploy the weapons 
Even if toe Soviet Union has built enormous
rn~litary  power durinq the last decades, there are
obvious weaknesses on the Soviet side as welle The
enormous Soviet mili tary power cannot compensate for
the glar ing weaknesses in the Soviet systemo A l though
the Soviet Union is in a relativeLy better position as to
access to oil and other minerals than is Western Europe,
the deplor able  ta te of Soviet agr ieul tur e is: one. but by no
means the only sign of the serious gaps in Soviet
economic development~ Other gaps include a dependence
on access to Western technologYe
14 - DF. 80.. 082  fin Events in Poland since early 1980 are indica-
tions of another striking weakness of the Soviet posi-
tion. The whole Soviet empire has to be kept together
by military force and stric~ police control. This
would appear to make a conscious Soviet decision to
launch a war upon Western Europe less likely.
However, the need for continued suppression in at least
part of Eastern Europe and the unwillinggess to allo\'1 .
organized political - opposition of any kind
may make new local explosions more and not less likely
in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it could be one of the
frightening scenarios for Europe that local unrest
could spread and involve soviet armed forces .and make
an incursion into NATO territory a temptation in order
to distx-act attention from the serious situation inside the borders
of the Soviet empire.
Threats to European secur i ty are normally
viewed wi thin an East/West context. However, as wars
in l~81 and 1982 have proved repeatedly (the Iran-Iraq
war, the Israel invasion of Lebanon, the Falkland war)
threats to peace and international security may arise outside
t:np Rast/West context.- ' European security is therefore not
to be viewed only on the basis of her geographical position
vis- vis ~he soviet Union, but also in terms of ' her
economic dependence on trade and her continued free
access to raw materials and broad internationi'll respect
fo'::" codes of conduct such as international law and
multilateral and bilateral treaties and conventions.
Seen in this light 1 the prospects for European security
can hardly be cons idered reassuring.
- 15 - PE. 30.082/fin.DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE
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Whether or not one believes that armaments
consti tute the pr imary source of international conflict
it is hardly a matter of dispute that disarmament
and arms control - two terms frequently used inter-
changeably - should be the subject of ser ious study
and discussion.
It would be erroneous to think that our
security concerns would simply disappear as a result
of disarmament and arms ~ontrol agreements. In fact,
one of the things that is wrong wi th the often heated
discussion is the blind fai th of far too many people
in them as panaceas leading to a peaceful wor Id.
One does not have to go to the other extreme
and state that arms are only the symptoms of
conflicts. The existence of arms and arms races may
indeed create or worsen tensions and thereby increase
the risk of open conflict  Following this line of
reasoning, it is therefore considered an indisputable
fact that arms control and disarmament can lead, and 
some cases have led, to measures stabilizing relations
between two opposing countries or groups of countries..
It is therefore, for the purpose of this report,
essential to take a closer look at present and future
arms control negotiations and agreements to assess the
contributions they may make to European security 
If no particular mention is made of the role
played by the Uni ted Nations it is because this role
has - unfortunately - been rather marginal except when
the two super-powers have played a leading part 
they did in the negotiations which led to the Non-
Prolifera tion Agreement in 1968.
The two special sessions of the Uni tea Nations
devoted exclus i vely to disarmament may have been use-
ful in highligh ting the preoccupation of government
leaders wi th disarmament problems, but they led 
virtually nothin9~ The second session held in the
Summer of 1982 was generally considered an Qutr ight
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UN sponsored disarmament negotiations continue
to take place in the frarnewor k of the Comrni ttee on
Disarmament (CD) , which was created by the 1978 UN
special session of disarmament to replace the Confe~
rence of the Commi ttee on Disarmament (CCD)  One of
the changes made was to increase the number of parti-
cipa ting countr ies, a procedure which in the past has
not led to more rapid progress, but the poli tical
pressure for more countr ies to take an active part
in the talks was too strong to resiste
As seen from the point of view of European
secur i ty, these UN talks are considered less impor tant
than the START, INF, and MBFR negotia~ions  Of these
negotia tions, the European countr ies take par t in the
MBFR talks only, but European secur i ty depends as muL'
if not more on the course and the eventual outcome of
the START and INF negotiations between the two super-
powers 
A men t ion s h a u L d a L so b e mad e of t he r 0 L e p ~a y e d 
by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
( C SeE) , eve n i f the s.e n ego t i a t ion s are not soL e  d e v 0 t e d 
t a s e cur i t  i s sue s .. Howe v e r d i s c u s s ion s .. on e 0 n f ide n c e
B u i L din 9 Mea sur e  (C B M s) and  the r s e cur i t Y r e ~ ate d i s s s ue s
h a v e s how ~ the pot en t i a L s i 9 n i f i can  f the on go i n  C SC EI
pro c e s s for E u r 0 pea n s e cur i t y, in s pi t e ~ f the d j"s a p p C? i  n tii n 9
resuLts of the two foL Low- up conferences to the ori ~inaL
HeLsinki Conference in 1975, i es the BeLgrade Conferenc~
i n 1977 - 7 8 and t he Mad rid Conference i  1 981:;- 82 
The START talks (Strategic Arms ReducL~on
Talks) , which began in Geneva in June 1982, are for all
practical purposes the continuation of the Strategic
Arms Limi ta tion Talks (SALT)  These talks resul tea
in the first SALT Agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union in 1972, later ratified by both
super-powers 1 and in the SALT II~Treaty signed in 1979 
Unlike SALT  the SALT II~Treaty was never ratified
- 1 7 - PE 80m O82/fin.by the United States ~ Senate because of the deteriora-
tion in East/West relations following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the widespread reservations 1. . ,1". 
In t e US a out toe prOV1Slons or coe Trea tv 
President Reagan let it be known in 19B1
that he did not irt : ld to ask the Senate to ratify
the SALT II Treaty as he shared the misgivings about
its provisions  However 1 both super~powers are apparent
1y adher ing to the provisions of the Treaty  pending
the outcome of the START talks begun in June 1982 
The new acronym START ~a ther than SALT is used 
under line the new US emphasis on reduction rather than
just limitation of the nuclear arsenals. This is 
line wi th President Reagan ~ s proposal for a new agree-
ment on strategic arms! which would lead to considerable
cuts in the present strategic armoury of the two super-
powers 
1::"1 1- 'i";
j,: .~. ~
..l.p deal !.I. 1: 
'- 
L.  L. 
-- .
~; 1. 1.... Li. ~-  c l~
": 
::J 
wi th In termedia te Range Nuclear E'orces (hence 'the terln n\lF) in
Europe  They (Y..)mpr ise f  .abo"e  11  the soy=called. 58 20 111issiles
which the Soviet Union started to deploy in the mid-
1970' s, and the planned 572 Pershing II and Cruise
Missiles which the NATO countr ies have decided 
deploy from 1983-84 onwards, unless the talks with
the Soviet Union on Il~P are successfu10
The Western negotiating position as outlined by Presi-
dent Reagan is one of the so-called zero-option 
I ,
implying that the West will not deploy the Pershing 
and Cruise Missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet
union agrees to cancel all its SS 20 missiles and
the sma Ler 55  and 55 5 Mi ssi les whi ch are oLder and
much l~ss sophi cated versions of the high ly mobi
SS 20 Mi ss; Les..
The' Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
were ear lier called TNF (Thea tre Nuclear Forces) and
. _. . " -. 
they are sometimes referred -to as t.he LRTNF (Long
Range Theatre Nuclear Forces) , a term used to
differentiate these medium range missiles from the
intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed 
the Soviet Union and in the United States or
C'; w- f 0  PE 80e O82/fin..on nuclear submar ines on the one hand, and from
tactical nuclear weapons to be used as battlefield
weapons on the other hand 
The MBFR talks star tea in 1973 as a sort of
mili tary co roll~ to the CSCE process  The participat- 
ing countr ies include all Warsaw Pact countr ies and
most NATO countr ies, notably minus France  They deal
wi th proposals to reduce the number of army and air
force personnel in a precisely defined area in Central.
Europe.
After more than 9 years of negotiations the
talks have produced no res ul ts, mainly because the two
pppos ing par ties have been unable to agree on the actual
force levels on both sides, the Soviet Union insisting
that the Warsaw Pact forces are at least 150. 000 men
smaller than pes tula ted by the NATO countr ies  The
East has claimed that there is a relative balance of
forces in Europe, whereas the West has always claimed
that there is a disparity amounting to more than
150  000 ground force personnel in favour of the East$
The declared Western aim is therefore to eliminate
this dispar i ty in order to enhance stabili ty in Central
Europe 
When the talks were resumed on 8th July, 1982, the:
NATO countries tabled a draft treaty proposing that
NATO and the Warsaw Pact agree to a common collective
ceiling of 9000 000 ground and air force personnel for
~ach alliance  the ground forces to represent no more
than 700~ OOO of theseo Whereas no immediate Soviet
reaction was for thcorning f it was pointed out hy 
Soviet spokesman that the West had made no effort 
estimate the numbers of forces currently deployede
Although both the negotiations on START and INF are bilateral
between the United States and the Soviet Union, both are of di rect interest
to the Europeans 
The Europeans have been closeLy invoLved i~ the evolution of the
I N F  ego t i a tin 9 p 0 sit ion sub m i t t e d b Y the  mer i can s in G e n e v a and the. U 
consults cLoseLy with its European alLies on all aspects of the negotiations
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through a SpeciaL Consultative Group (SCG)  The United States aLso
informs its ALL ies on a reguLar basis of deveLopments in the START
negoti at ions.
By late autumn 1982, no progress had been
repor ted on the INt"l talks, and Sovi et statements by amnog others,
President Bresjnev in November 1982 indicated a hardening of the
Soviet position. The European NATO countries have warmly welcomed
side t'- Reaga' n '- opo al--- a" zer
:::
opt bh,- a  pro
-;.. --,
posal which was seen by some commentators as a conces-
sion to European pressures, which were, in part, due to
the widespread demonstrations against the planned deployment
of American medium range missiles. It was also seen as a
response to the rise of peace movements not only in several
Western European countries but also in the United States.
As far as the CSCE process is concerned, the
disappointing outcome of the Madr id conference in the
spring of 1982 was due to the new and colder climate
in East/West relations and not' to any reduced European
- , -,.., .
interest in d~tente, arms control and confidence
building measures. The proposal tabled by Fr ance to
hold a European disarmament conference has not been
ab~ndoned and has in fact won general support~ The
holding of this conference and the prospects for 
achieving concrete results obviously depend on the
development of East/West relations, including develop-
ments in Afghanistan and, in par ticular, in Poland 
A further extension of the confidence building
measures such as pre-notification of mili tary manoeuvres
and exchange of mili tary observers will also have 
awai t new developments in East/West rela tions in Europe 
When the Madrid Conference resumed on 9 November 1982,
the prospects for a successful outcome had hardLy improved~
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It is a source of great concern to some and
a source of great relief to others that the European
Communi ty is an economic and poll tical enti ty wi thout
a military dimension. That this is so in no way
means that Western Europe has neglected its defence 
However, the task of providing for the defence of
Western Europe has been entrusted to the national
governments of the Western European countr ies and, in the
case of mos t Western European countr ies, , in close
. co-oper a tion wi th the Uni ted S ta tes and Canada wi thin
the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is not
disputed that miLitary defence faLLs outside the scope of
responsibili ty of the European Communi ty 
Throughout the history of the European Commu-
ni ty, it has repeatedly been discussed if and when a
military dimension could and should be added to the
economic and poli tical dimensions  Wi thout going into
the already long history of the European unification
movement and of the European Communi ty, it should 
recalled that p~ans for the European Defence Community preceded
the European Communi ty and that the said Defence Commun-
i ty never got off the ground Q In fact, the present European
Communi ty may part Ly owe its ex i stence to the coL L~pse of the
. planned . European Defence Communi ty in 1954 
Two motives were behind the EDC Treaty in the
early 1950 ~ s  One was to incorporate a German mili tary
contr ibution to the defence of Western Europe, thereby
avoiding the creation of a new German army and a national
general staff  The other mati ve was to br ing about
a shor t-cut to the crea tion of a European poli tical
union wi thout which a common defence was not conceivable
The two had to go together i'# That was as t rU-e then as it
is true today 
The refusal of the Uni tea Kingdom to join the
EDC and the non-ratification by the French National
Assembly in August 1954 effectively blocked the crea-
tion of a truely uni ted poli tical European enti ty wi th
its own integrated defence~ The means by which the
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about would have to be realized in other ways - if at all.
This has not stopped the discussion as to how a
close European defence cooperation could be brought about.
25 years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the
Community  may  not have moved closer to the establishment
of a separate European defence capabili ty, but Europeans
are as preoccupied with security issues as ever. This
preoccupation is by no means exclusively focused on the
needs to bring about a specific European defence entity,
which is a very controversial subj ect in several Communi 
Member States. It rather takes th~ form of advocating an
active policy of d~tentel in some cases amounting to a
policy of equi-distance for Western Europe vis-a-vis the
two super-powers. others  however, see a need to
strengthen both the conventional and the nuclear defence
of Western Europe. This explains the European support for
the decision in 1978 to increase defence expenditures 
NATO by 3 per cent annually in real terms, (although the
decision was never implemented in full) and the double
decision in December 1979 to deploy Pershing II and Cruise
Missiles from 1983 onwards and to start arms control
negotiations wi th the Soviet Union 
There is no agreement on the COll:.?~yuences o
Western Europe having no defence capabili ty of its
own~ In a booklet in 1981 written by the directors
of four Western foreign policy insti tutes, it was
stated, i SO far, despite the existence of two nuclear
powers in Western Europe and of a strong German conven- 
tional army, the Europeans have not been willing 
able since 1954 to move towards a more independent
,..
European defence posture  This failure has inhibi tea
Europe I s abili ty to play a more significant role in
wo r 1 d a f f air so
This may or  may  not be true 0 It cannot be
stated with any certainty that Western European in-
fluence in world affairs depends on the ability of
the Communi ty to project mili tary power in other par 
of the wor1d0 It may even be alleged that the civilian
status of the Community may make it somewhat more
.... 22  PE 80DO82/fin.attractive as an active partner to several countries
of the Third War Id, as they view wi th cons ider able
distrust the awesome rnili tary capabili ties and possible
intentions of the two competing super-powers~
On the other hand, it can hardly be disputed
that if European integra tion is to continue, and 
European Poli tical Co-Operation is to grow significantly
over the next 5-10 years,. then the comrron security concerns
of the ten, soon to be twelve, Member States of the
. Communi ty will become more easily identifiable and
reinforce the discussion of a new insti tutional
approach to European defence.
However, a quick look at the existing insti tutions
dealing wi th European defence tasks and preoccupa tions
does not appear to make it more likely that the Europ-
ean Communi ty is about to develop its own mili tary
dimension 
The  ~estern European Union as it exists today
on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1955
may be regarded by many as obsolescent and a relic of
the past~ However t it is worth recalling that article
V of the Brussels Treaty lays down the nature of the
commitment entered into by its signatories for their
collective security~ Article VIII defines the foreign
policy and defence implications of this undertaking 
The WED con tinues to play an arms con trol role,
even if some of the original 1955 provisions have been
modified~ Furthermore, the Assembly of Western European"
Union continues to devote considerable time and work
to defence issues, which are the proper responsibili ties
of the Assembly  and regularly adopts recommendations
in the field of defence 
The present French Government has mor than
once made references to the existence of the Western
European Union as the proper forum for a debate on
European defence 
The reports adopted arid- publ-rshed "by the Western
European Union on a number of defence issues are generally of
a high quali ty, and some of them have been used as backqround
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However, the Western European Union cannot
be considered the natural vehicle for creating a closer
Western European defence co-operation . nor for
adding a mill tary dimension to the European
Community. This is due to its limited membership, 
the general lack of interest even among several of the
member governments, and to the improbability of EEC
countries like Ireland, Denmark f and Greece joining
the Western European Union~ It would be unfortunate
if some kind of rivalry should develop between the
Western European Assembly and the European Parliament
or, for that matter, between the Western European
Union and the European Communi ty as to which insti tu-
tieD should be the focal point for a future European
secur i ty policy  One way to avoid this ~ s to keep 
mind the difference between the mili tary aspects of
security, which are properly being discussed and dealt
wi th by the Western European Union, and the broader
issues of secur i ty, which will increasingly play
role in the European Communi ty 
Two 0 the r ins tit uti 0 n s w h i L e m a kin 9 use f u L
tions to Western European defence cannot be con-
sidered adequate as a wider framework for a closer
co-operation on defence among the ten Member States
of. the European Communi ty  One is the Euro-Group,
which was created in 1968, comprising the European
. . Member States of the Atlantic Alliance except France 
The pr imary task of Euro-Group remains the improvement
of the defence capabili ties of NATO in Europe  The
Euro-Group activities are divided among seven
sub-groups 1) The Euro-Group is closely associa tea
wi th NATO, and an addi tional task under taken by the
1) The seven groups are: Euro-:-CorTI, Euro-Nad, Euro-Longterrn,
Euro-Med, Euro-Log  Euro/NATO-Training and
Eur 0-8 tr uc tur e
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to give public opinion, particularly in the
Uni tea States, a better knowledge of the extent and
nature of the contr ibution of Euro-Group countr ies
to the Alliance  s defence 
The  IndeEendent Euro~ean Pro9ramme GrauE
(IEPG) , which was founded in February 1976 with the
aim of furthering European co-operation in the defence
equipment field, consists of all European member states
in NATO wi th the exception of Iceland. The participa-
tion of France has enabled the IEPG to become gradually
the pivotal European organization in the field of
defence procurement. This means that nine of the ten
present Member States of the Communi ty take part 
IEPG, the major objective of which is to create the
basis for a more equi table European co-pperation wi 
the Uni ted States and Canada in production and procure~
. .
ment in the defence equipment field 
There is no formal link between NATO and
IEPG, a factor that has made it possible for France
to take part in the work$ However, the actual progres
of IEPG has been rather limited and, in the words of
one of its active participants, there has so far been
more promise than delivery ~ The IEPG is not linked
to the Communi ty in any way  but the work of the IEPG
would cer tainly have to be taken into consideration
if fur ther progress is to be achieved wi thin the Com-
munity to co-ordinate arms procurementQ arms production,
and. arms sales as proposed first in the 1978 Klepsch
report an in the orthcom1ng Fergusson report..
Several suggestions have been made in the
past to co-ordinate the Br i tish and the French nuclear
forces, and there has even been some talk of Franco-
German nuclear co-oper a tion  For sever al reasons
these proposals have never been realized and are unlikely
to be realized under the present circumstances. Under
the prevailing strategic conal tions  Western Europe
seems highly unlikely to be able to develop a credible
dete;rent of its own~ It would require a much closer
( 1) 
See also the report by David Greenwood of late 1980 to the Commission
of the European Communi ties on a policy for promoting defence and
tecru1o1ogical cooperation among West European countries
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An insti tutionalized approach to setting-up a
distinct European defence enti ty seems therefore, for
the time being, to be out of the question  wi thout
even consider ing whether or not this would be desirable. 
This leaves European poli tical Coope ation (EPC) 
which despite its lack of institutional machinery -
or maybe even because of it - is more likely to play
an ever increasing role in the developing European
secur i ty concept  Whether or not this will lead 
the establishment of a mill tary dimension for the
Communi ty is for the future to tell.
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Ever since the onset of the cold war Western European 
security has been closely linked to and, in fact, depend
upon Nor th Arner ica, afid the Dni tea States continues
play a crucial role in European secur i ty  The signing
of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949,comprising
nine of the ten present Communi ty Member States and
the setting-up of NATO, comprising eight of the Community
Member states, was tantamount to the creation of a multi-
lateral and institutional framework for the Unl tea States
mill tary presence in Europe to carry out the Unl tea
Sta tes  guarantee against potential Soviet agression.
./.
Significant changes in the Atlantic relation-
ship could therefore have a far-reaching impact upon
European secur i ty  This is not the place to review all
the dfve gencies between the United-' States"and western
Europe  In any discussion of the cr isis in NATO -
as it is some times called - it should be recalled that
many such cr ises have occurred in the 33 year old history
of the Atlantic Alliance 
Atlantic divergencies have been reflected 
different assessments of the Soviet menace and in the
conduct of detente policyo In the early 1980 i 5, import~
ant economic issues have come to the fore  The dispute
over steel expor ts from the Communi ty to the Uni ted
Sta tes and over agr icul tural policies is to be seen agains~
the background of the drawn out eco~qll~i ~i.sj s in the industriali sed
Following the decision by the United States  Government in June 1982
to appl y sanctions against US companies in Europe or European companies
working on US licenses to delay or to prevent the much discussed natural
gas project from the Soviet Union to a number of Western European
countries, yet another element has been added to strain the reLationship
between the Un; ted States and the CommunitYa
worLd.
Even if the disagreements are mainly outside
the field of securi ty, European- American disputes over
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vi tal economic matters could lead to troubles for the
Atlantic Alliance because the mutual perceptions of
the Atlantic relationship would inevi tably be affected
by disputes which have their origin in different economic
policies and in two distinctly different views as to
the proper policy vis~a-vis the Soviet Union0
For the purpose of this repor t one par ticular
aspect needs closer examina tion insofar as it has a
bear ing on the poll tical aspect of the Atlantic rela-
tionshipo This concerns the evolution of EPC and the
relationship between poli tical consul tations in EPC
and the poll tical consultations which are taking place
in the NATO Council among the NATO Ambassadors and
their principal aide&~
Dur ing the past 10 years  EPC has come 
play an ever increasing role in identifying and pursuing
corn~n European interests.
l) It was pointed out  the
then six Member States, as far back as  1970  that 
secur i ty concerns were not to be explici tly excluded
from the foreign policy deliberations among the Community
Member States  In fact, secur i ty issues as such were
only rarely discussed and rnili tary problems never 
However, the co-operation among the nine Member States
dur ing the preparatory and later phases of the Conference
on Secur i ty and Co-Operation in Europe did br ing 
a number of secur i ty issues, even if it almos t happened
a backdoor  The CSCE process has been less dominated
by secur i ty problems than might appear from the term
itself 0 But a practice developed according to which the
EEC States co-ordinated their views amongst them-
selves before they were taken up in the NATO Council,
sometimes including issues that cer tainly bordered on
secur i ty such as the Confidence Building Measures be-
tween East and West in Europe and the holding of a dis-
armament conference in Europe on the basis of the French
proposalo By and large Q this practice was deemed useful
by all countr ies concerned including those NATO countr ies
1) For a history of EPC and the Par liament ~ s recommenda-
tions for further development of EPC! see the report
by Lady Elles  adopted by the European Par liament
. on July 9, 1981 (Doc  No ~1-3 35/81)
-. 
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The expansion of EPC involving a growing
number of officials from the Foreign Minis tr ies of the
now ten Member States, the frequent participation by
the Political Directors and the discussion of foreign
policy issue~ not only among the Foreign Ministers of
the Ten but even in the European Council, have come
to mean that EPC is having a policy-making role wi th
obvious implications for the consultations conducted mt~
in NATO.
Contrary to the belief of some  this is not
due to the Ten deliberately making inroads on securi 
issues which have been the principal themes constantly
under review in the NATO Council. Military/security
issues continue to be avoided in the EPC, but the latest
repor t on EPC  the London report adopted in October 1981
dur ing the UK presidency - recognized for the first
time that secur i ty issues have a place in EPC 
This was stated in the passage of the report
which reads, ' As regards the Scope of EPC and having
regard to the different si tuations of the Member States,
the Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to
discuss in poB tical CO-opera Hon certain impor tant
foreign policy questions bearing on the pori tical aspects
of secur i ty 0 '
EPC delibera tions on secur i ty are limi ted on the one hand by the participa tion of the Republic
of Ireland , which adheres to a policy of neutrality.
This Ir ish neutrali ty is to be viewed in a historical
con text and therefore to be seen especially in the light of the sometimes strain~ relationship 
wi th the United Kingdom. It has not prevented Ireland from taking full part in EPC, although the need to maintain Irish neutra-
lity was given as the official explanation for Ireland'
posi tion our lng the latter ph~se of the Falkland con-
flict in 1982. The other constraint on EPC delibera-
tions on secur i ty stemmed from the simple fact that vital securi 
ty issues  including mili tary as well 
29 - PE 80~ O82/finMnon-mili tary aspects of secur i ty  are being deal t wi 
in a forum involving both the Uni tea States and Canada
and those European states which are members of NATO
but not of the European Communi ty, such as Norway,
Turkey, Iceland, and - for a brief while yet -
Spain and Portugal.
The growing scope and the increasing signifi-
cance of EPC consul tations have indisputedly downgraded
to some e~tent the NATO consul tations. This is in par-t also
due to the way EPC consul ta tions are be ing prepared and
carried out by the Foreign Ministries of the Ten in ever
closer co-opera tion. This has the effect of sometimes
pre-empting NATO consultations, which are not and cannot
be limi tea to strictly mili tary aspects of secur i ty.
The difference is, however, that secur i ty deli-
berations in NATO are always to be seen against the back-
ground of the role played by the armed forces of the
Member Sta tes -of the Alliance in deterr ing aggression
and promoting d~tente, whereas EPC scrupulously avoids
discussing rnili tary issues for a vaL iety .of reasons 
No formal liaison exists between EPC and NATO and in BrusseLs
there are generally no Lines of communication between EEC officiaLs
of the Commission and the Council  including those
wor king on poli tical problems  and NATO officials 
The modus operandi of NATO and EPC is qui 
different~ The Foreign Ministers meet twice a year
in the NATO Council, whereas the day-to-day work 
being carr ied out by the permanent representati ves
and their staffs  OVer the years they have established
almost a club~like atmosphere in which policy recommenda-
tions and decisions are being taken on a number of poli-
tical and poli ticalfmili tary issues wi th the ever-present
aim of maintaining an effective deterrent posture.
Within EPC, the Foreign Ministers meet more
frequently  So do the poli tical Directors and several
other officials, who form a number of speciali zed work-
ing groups  Because of the frequency of these meetings
on several levels and the continuous co~ordination of
views by way of the electronic links that connect all
Foreign Ministries of the Ten p the EPC process manages
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stage up to and including meetings of Foreign Ministers
and Heads of Government.
Procedures rather than themes are therefore
one reason why the EPC process may appear 
to play
more crucial role in actual decison~aking.
There is also an inherent attraction to'  EPC,
. - .. 
because it is a relatively new phenomenon, and it forms
part of a European unification'  process that may have
lost much of its drive and public appeal, at least as
far as many aspects of Community policies are 
concerned. But E~ has fur that nry rea~ an a~al of its  because it does 9 i ve the impression of a Europe on the move. ~nics may add that it is easier to agree on
lofty statements of principle and declarations of intent, such as the Venice Declaration on 
the Middle East, than
it is to agree on policies which entail financial com-
mitments or political obligations which may hurt 
home. It is politically more attractive - and sometimes easier -
to make it look as if the Community is actively involved in solving the problems of the Middle East 
than to reach
an agreement on a fisheries polic~
It may also be a fact that poli tical securi-
ty issues which are being dealt wi th in EPC are consider-
ed so much mor e appeali ng than mil i tar y / secu r i ty i ss ue s , especially when the latter involve expenditures and maybe
poli tically controversial co~i ~ents such as the c~- mi tment to depl~ nuclear weapons. In EPC, the talks focus more on CSCE, confidence building and even disar-
rnar~an to
It goe s almos t wi thou t say i"g tha t it could pro v e po Ii ti call y d i s r up t i ve 0  th e  tl anti e re 1 a t ion - ship if the Europeans were left to consider the less controversial and politically more attractive 
issues within the context of the EPC, even including disarma-
ment and arms control, whereas the more controversial
issues were left to AATO. Such a division of labour does not, of course, exist but the i~ression 1ing~a
that it is nevertheless so.
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I I  I . -The difficul ties ar ise out of the histor ical
fact that NATO consultations and EPC approach security
issues from opposite sides. It therefore needs pointing
out that if EPC should ever becorne ~re closely involved
in drawing up arms control schemes and disarmament
plans, it is an absolute necessity that EPC tackle the
problems of which arms to control and which armaments
to reduce. If that were to happen it ~uld be unavoid-
.-.- - .._- -"'-" '. -"-" -----. - -- --. ._--.
able that EPC should deal with the strictly m; l itary aspects
of security i.e. defence, although that is anathema
to some political parties and governments 
in the Community
- and probably unwelcome to NATO countries outside the
Communi ty. It would be sheer bypo r; sy, however, to let
the pub  e: . ,g q in, th. imp res s ; 0 n t.h ate ERt.-:-c Q u L. d r end e r ~rt~ile ~tri~ti~s  the o~iq de~~ ~ 
control and disarmament wi thout going into the more
. difficult area of arms deployment, force levels and
other defence related topics 
Rather than keeping away from such topics it might be advisable for EPC to tackle th~m, as this may have a salutary effect upon those who think
there is a short cut to a more comfortable level of
national and international security by concentrating
on arms control wi thout taking into account the role
played by armed forces on both sides in Europe, to main-
tain a balance of power.
There is little doubt that the continuing EPC
process presents problems, especially in relation 
the United States. Any US Government is usually finding
itself in the difficult role of being criticized if it
exercises forceful leadership, out of oeing equally
. criticized if it avoids exercising any leadership  all. European atti tudes vis-a-vis the presidencies of
Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan are cases in point. However,
a cer tain frustration on the par t of the Uni ted States
is sometimes felt in Washington, when the administration
is confronted with an EPC process whose agenda 
it may
be unaware of and whose results may prove embarrassin~
as seen fr~ an ~rican ~int of vi~  la~r coo-
suI tations in NATO.
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able burden upon the pori tical tact and diplomacy of
th~ presiding country among the Ten. I t would be both
unrealistic and undesirable to try to put a brake on
the expanding EPC process. I t is par t of the uneven
and sometimes slightly disorganized development towards
the elusive objective of a distinct European identi ty
tpwards which the Uni ted States has always pro~essed
its sympathy"
It may be an addi tional obstacle for fully
appreciating EPC that it sometimes ' appears from the out-
s i de i to be in a much more advanced stage than it
really is D It is also true that the legal distinction
between external relations decided on a Communi ty
basis in the economic field and poli tical decisions
taken wi thin the context of EPC are not comprehended
by the outside war Id, which often fails to notice
which ha ts Foreign Ministers of the Ten are wear ing 
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There have been nuclear weapons in Europe
for almost 30 years. The first were so-called tactical
nuclear weapons sent to the US forces in Europe in the
early ' 50s following a NATO decision and made ava i la~ Le
to certain other NATO forces in Europe under the 80-
called double key system. The number of nuclear warheads
supplied by _t~~ Uni ~~d States and stationed in Western
Europe was for many years semi~officially gi ven to be
about 7.. 000 
After NATO. s decision in December 1979 to
deploy medium range missiles from 1983, it was decided
to wi thdraw 10 000 US warheads, a decision that was
im?lernented by Decemb~~ 19800
Other nuclear weapons in Europe on the Western
side include of course the French and Br i tish nuclear
forces 
The deba te on nuclear
weapons reached new heights in the ear ly 1980 9 S as a
resul t of the so-called double decision by NATO 
December 1979, which was again preceded by the deploy-
ment of the Soviet 58 20 missiles each equipped with
three separately guided warheads~ By late 1 982 the
number of Soviet S8' 20 missiles exceeded .3 2 
Wi th very detai led informa tion on nuclear 1) e ~ weapon deployment in Europe available e sew ere , 1 
is beyond the scope of this report to give a
breakdown of the number of nuclear weapons in Europe
:\r'.c~ '.:.heir classifications and of the different assess-
1) 
Among :he most recent publications on ruclear weapons in Europe, the
rapporteur has found particularly useful the report to the .Assembly
of Western European Union  The Problem of Nuclear ~Jeapons in Europe
by MrlO Morrmerste€gp tPJho is aLs meirber of the European Parliament,
the AdeLph; Paper No.. 168 on  f\ucLear weapons in Europe ' by Gregory
Trevertan, who was ole of the ex rts  who ~ddre d the PoL itical
Affai rs I Comn;ttee of the European Parl 
lament in Decernber 1981 in London,
and the Handbook  Nuc lear Forces In Eur~€ f by H ~J ~ Neumann The Last
two publ ications are issued by the interrational Institute for Strategic
Studies in London.. They are aLL incLuded in the bibl iography..
34 - PE 80.. 082/f in..ments  the current military balance.
golng
Three basic Dbser\lations are required before
into the very significant role played by nuclear
weapons both in the present mili tary calculations on
both sides and in the public debate in most Communi 
Membe r Sta tes:
- The large scale demonstrations in favour of
! banning the bomb I and several statements by leading
poli ticians and other leading figures in Western Europe
notwi thstanding  it must be stated categorically
that nuclear weapons cannot be totally abolished 
for
the
no. other reasons ,than becauS'e " we cannot obLi.tera'
knowledge  of  how to make
~. "
1\...1 
There is therefore no conceivabLe poLicy providing
an absolute guarantee that a nuclear war will not break
out  that nuclear
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PE 80" 082/ fin 'Nuclear weapons carne to Europe in order to
offset the quanti tative Soviet preponderance in con-
ventional forces in Europe. This preponderance has
continued to exist and is generally believed to have grown more
pronounced due ing the 1970 Q S g especially as the quali-
tative lead by NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact has now
been mainly eroded. Even more significant has been
the development in the Soviet arsenal of strategic
nuclear weapons, which by the mid~seventies resulted
in what ;s n9w considered 'parity in terms of strategic weapons between
the two supe rpowers. At present- ' the -Sov; et
, '
Un; on. ho lds' a c Lear
lead in the number of weapon launchers and in total
megatonnage, whereas the Uni tea States still has a
lead in the total number of warheads 
It should be added that this is the prevail-
ing Western view on the balance of forces between East
and West. The Soviet view is different 
The Soviet Union maintains that there is a rough balance
in all ca tegor ies of weapons and forces, even if there
are certain asymmetries in a ntm1ber of ttleapon categorieso' The
Soviet Union does not deny, however, that, the overall
global balance of forces has changed  The official
Soviet expression is that the correlation of forces 
has been considerably improved and that the Socialist
camp v has grown strooger 
It is t~refore to be assu~d that the S~iet Union accep,s
that a"state of nuctear parity roughtrr exists between the Soviet Uni~n
and the Uni ted States.. . Th; s was so-to-speak codi f ied by the
SALT I Agreement in 1972, the most important part of
which was net the ~eiling agreed on for offensive
strategic weapons, but the virtual outlawing of missile
defence systems (the Anti Ballistic" Missiles Treat~
except t 'for the protection of 6ne limited are~ only~
The provisions of SALT I are still in force,
. al though new technolog ical developments have led to
a renewed discussion in the Uni ted States as to the
desirabili ty of building an ABM systemo
- 36 - PE 80..082/fin..
PE "80. 082The abolition of ABM systems gave credence
to the ~idely accepted notion or doctrine of ' Mutually
Assured Destrucuon sometimes referred to as MAD.
This doctr ine is based
on the capacity and the intention to retaliate in kind.
Insofar as the notion of ~D can be considered
a ~ilitary doctrine at alIa it is flawed.
Its credibili ty in preventing nuclear war presupposes
not only an element of stability in the relations
between the two super-powers but also in the political
situation within the two countries and the absence of
serious c::rises in the world, which might upset the
bilateral super-power relationship.
In view of the strategic parity  the credibl-
Ii ty of the Uni ted States nuclear guarantee has also
be.en questioned by many  as it was by de Gaulle already
in the rnid-l960' s  when the French President wi thdrew
France troIn the integrated and US dominated defence
system in NATO.
The debate has for many years ~ente~ed round
the question of whether the United States ' President would be
willing to retaliate in kind in case of a Soviet nuclear
aggression against Western Europe or part of. Western
Europe - or to use nuclear weapons against a conventional Soviet
attack. Would the US President be vJilling to risk the destruction
of Washingtor1p Boston and Pittsburg for attacks on Hamburgp Portsmouth
and Bologna? Such questions and other points raised in the nuclear
debate may not take fully into account the compLexities and the
uncertainty ~.ft1ich are parts of the de te r r en t theory. The
counterargument says that the Soviet Union is effectively
deterzed not by any certainty of the Uni ted States
response to an aggression but. by the uncertainty 
to how and where a .r iposte will in fact ge made.
There is  in other words. a considerable
element of ambiguity in the nuclear equation betvleen
East and West. The important feature is  i!  however 
that the situat:i.on is changing all the time and it
is indisputable that the Western preponderance/ on which
NATO strategy was based for several years  has given
way to a situation marked by parity on the strategic
- 37 - PE 80. o821fi n.level and continued Soviet preponderance insofar as
conventional forces are concerned  The latest element
is the Soviet build-up of what is called by strategists
Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF)  mainly
the deployment of the 58 20 missiles 
Following a speech by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
to the International Insti tute for Strategic Studies
in London in 1977, the NATO countries started to con-
sider the best way of dealing \4ith what was viewed as
an addi tional threat to the West and, in particular,
to Western Europe - deliberations which led to the al-
ready frequently mentioned NATO double decision 
December 1979 C!)
This is the basis for the current controversy
over nuclear weapons 0 It is remarkable to note that
the exi stence of sever al thousand nuclear warheads 
Western Europe and a similar or possibly smaller number
of nuclear weapons in the East never gave rise to a
debate of the kind which Europe has exper ienced dur ing
the past 18 monthse Debates were ea r l i er provoked when
the deployment of enhanced ra d i at ion weapons the so.:-c-a L ~ed
~ t r 0 n b 0 m b - was d i s clJ sse d u hat p Lan 9 a v e - r i s e  t 0
cross-Atlantic misunderstandings and to President
Carter shelving the production of the
weapon, though President Reagan later dec idea to
produce i t wi thout making its possibLe depLoyment
in Western Europe an issue 
The medium range missiles wi th nuclear warheads
now commonly referred to as INF (Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces) have come to epi tomize the very hea ted
nuclear debate and have crea ted poli tical difficul ties
in saIne 'tvestern' European countr ies as far as the deploy-
ment of these weapons is concerned  Opposi tion to the
deployment has been voiced within the German Social Democratic
Party and the SPD~ S former coaL ition partnerp the FDP..
Bot h the pre v i 0 us a n d p r. e 5 e n t G e-f man go v e rn men t s h a 
refused to modify the German acceptance of the NATO
decision in 1979 u which wa~ by defini tion, a unanimous
decision(!j Since then the Belgian go~lernment has l1aef to make its
38 - PE 80.. 082/fin..posi tion  on  the deployment issue explicitly dependent
upon the outcome of the INF talks started  on  30th No-
vember 198!.
The situation in the Netherlands is aLso uncertain
after the former centre~left government decided on an open-ended
postponement of the decision  on  whether to station the
planned 48 Cruise Missiles  on  Dutch ten:i tory. l'
Whereas the resumption of the INF talks in
late 1981 has had a somewhat calming effect upon the
groups in Western Europe, which took to the streets
earlier  on  in protest against the decision to deploy
medium range missiles in Western Europe, the political
unrest and demonstrations could very well return if
the INF negotiations have not made real progress by
the summer of 1983. The deployment of the 572 missiles
in Western Europe is scheduled to start in the autumn
of 1983 and to be completed by 1988.
Whereas the first round of INF talks until.
March 30, 1982 was descr ibed as businesslike, no progress
was noted. The Soviet position differs markedly from
the Western post tion. In the Soviet calculation of the
INF balance, a number of US weapon systems. consisting
primarily of fighter bombers in Western Europe plus the
French and Br i tish nuclear forces  is included so as to
make a rough balance. The Soviet position that a balance
already exists is also explained by a reference to the
partial removal of the obsolescent SS 4 and 55 5 missiles
which have been replaced by SS 20 missiles during the
Pqst five years. The United States position in favour
of a zero solution - which has been accepted by all
NATO countr :es - has been cr iticized by the Sovi~t
Union a.s favour ing NATO.
Whatever one v s assessment of the current
balance of forces and the prospects for the INF talks
The same rurber - 48 Cruise MissiLes - is envisaged to be depLoyed on BeLgian territory.
The United Kingdan has cormnitted itseLf to depLoying 160 Cruise r~issiLes, ItaLy 112 Cruise
Missi Les, and the Federal RepubLic of Germany 96 Cruise Missi Les + 108 Pershing II Missi Les.
The Latter are intended to repLace the 108 Short Range Pershing I Missi Les.
The missiles - if deployed - wiLL not be depLoyed in alL 5 countries at the same time. 
is envisaged that the depLoyment wi Ll begin in the UK by the end of 1983 and considerabLy
Later in BeLgium and HoLland. ~ 39 - PE 8O.082/fin.there is Ii ttle doubt that the Bri tish and, in particular,
the French nuclear forces are playing an impor tant role
in both mill tary and arms control calculations  France
refuses to let French nuclear forces be counted as part
of the NATO forces. France is not taking part in the
NATO consul tations on INF (or the parallel START talks)- 
though President Mi tterand has publicly and clearly
supported the decision to deploy American medium-range
missiles in Western Europe to offset the Soviet advanta~
in these weapons.
. .. . - ..  - . .- -
Such are, briefly summarized, the nuclear
issues currently under discussion in most Community
Member States. There is no question of the Communi 
being involved in the military nuclear controversies
as such. They are not being debated by the EEC Council
or by foreign ministers in the context of EPC. It 
nevertheless evident that the preoccupation wi th the
nuclear weapon issue in most Communi ty countries and
in many other countr les as well, and the growing signi-
f icance  of secur i ty problems in EPC, make it impossible to
- bypass these nuclear issues in any report dealing with
European security.
- 40 - PE  8O..082/~in.THE GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 
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The inclination to compartmentalize the
treatment of foreign policy issues into distinct
categories and isolate those with security implications
from those w~ thout secur i ty implications is gradually
being over taken by events  ;c~sues like defence planning and. -
wea~ns deployment are obviously related directly to. defence and are
deal t wi th in NA'IO and by national gover nmen ts - not by the EX: and
EPCo The relations between "the European (;onmunity and. many parts of
the 'WOrld, including the 'lbirg World; may be economic and political
but are not deprived of security implications, when one considers
for example the dependence of Western Europe on external supplies
of raw materials.
The European Communi ty is unable to project mili-
tary power on a Communi ty basis to other parts of the
world, including those from where the Community gets
its vi tal supplies  Nobody can deny, however  the need
to maintain condi tions allowing for continued and un-
interrupted trade and the European Communi ty is in a
posi tion to apply both poli tical and economic means to
maintain those condi tions ~ It would therefore be wrong
to deny tha t the European Communi ty  the larges t tr ading
bloc in the war Id, has a strategic role to perform
in the war Id, even if tha t role is per formed by non-
military meanS0 It should be added that individual
members of the Community are free to act in a military
capaci ty and that mill tary actions  such as those carr ied
out by France in Afr ica and by the Uni ted Kingdpm against
the Argentinia~ occupa tion of the Falkland Islands
do not require prior approval by the
other member s of the Communi ty 
The participation of certain Communi ty countr lest
1 )
No cooplete inventory of the mineral and vegetable ra~J materials
ava; lable in the Community exists9 H~Jever, a usefuL survey
with much practicaL infonn3tion and a nuTIJer of recommendations
is contained in the report by Mrs.. L.. t'loreau drawn up on behalf
of the Committee Q~ External Economic Relations  (DocQ  1-873/81) JI'
which was ado~ted by the European Parliament on March 9  1982~
- 41 - PE 80..08~/fin..1 n Pea ce--Keepi ng Forces" such "1  Cyprus and 1 n the r~l i d d l e
East most recent L Y 1 n Bei rut 1 S aLso e \~ ide nee the fact
that Commun i  Menibe r Stares can and ~)'J  iLL pLay military roLe
outside the cont i nent Europe 1 n the interest avoiding military
confLict~ The part i cipation
II' some Communi ty coutries 1 n the Peace-
Keeping For c e " i n Sinai r; 
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80.. 082 / fin..vi tal oil supplies from the Middle East. That si tuation
has been evident for a number of years, however, and it
has not led the members of the European Communi ty to
take steps to try to protect these vi tal supply routes
by mill tary means on a Communi ty basis  However, some
Communi ty countr ies are mili tar ily acti ve, or could
become rnilitarJly active, in the area if requir~d, but
it is generally recognized that in terms of military
defence the Uni tea States' role will  in any case be
vi tal.
Whenever individual Member States of the
. Communi ty ,and Communi ty insti tutions or the ten Govern-
ments acting collectively are taking steps in the
poli tical and economic sphere to protect the interests
of Western Europe, it has a bear ing on European secur i ty.
It is a L so t rue that it is a matter of concern: to the
Communi ty wh~at kind of governrne~t ex i st s in the deve lop-
ing world. Through the Lome Convent ton the Communi 
maintains particularly close relations wi th 6 3 develop-
ing countr ies, above all in Afr ica, and al though the
Lome Convention does not in any way imply a protective
European role vis-a-vis the 6 3 iACP countr ies - and
would be counterproductive if it did - it is in the
interest of the Communi ty that these countries act
as free agents and do not become satell! tes of external
powers 0 It is in the same vein that the Communi ty will
always be interested in encouraging a poli tical evolu-
tion towards democratic and pluralistic societie~,
though there  is  , of course  no attempt being made to
enforce such developments on the par t of the CUnutauuJ. LYIJ
- ------ ---
The active involvement of the Community and its Member
States is also evident in countries and regions which are less
directly associated with Community than are the Lome countries.
One example is the agreement concluded between the Community
and the ASEAN countries in South-East Asia.
1 This situation was dealt wi th in the report prepared for
the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Diligent, Doc. 1-697/80-
adopted by the European Parliament on 19 November 1981.
- 43 - PE 80..082/fineIn the framework of EPC  the Ten have repeated-
ly expressed views on developments in Asia? Latin
America and Af~ica. Although such pronouncements and"
sometimes even actions can frequently be seen in the
light of the humani tar ian effor ts under taken by the ~~ni~ ~ere is o~iously a distinct ~litical ~r-
specti ve in such pesi tions 
~ .
They are implici tly  if not explici tly  designed to
foster developments towards a greater degree of stabili-
ty as is for instance/ the case in Central Amer ica~
In cone Lus ion, it is fa i r to say that a Lthough the
European Communi ty a Lways and its Member States usua  ly, abstai 
from direct mi Litary intervention in Third WorLd Affairs
the Communi ty has considerable leverage by virtue
of its economic power to influence developments 
var ious par ts of the war Id 
On a number of occasions the Communi ty has flexed its economic muscles  In May 1980, economic
sanctions were introduced against Iran~ They were
limi tea in scope and had presumably 1i ttle e f fee t 
Economic sanctions were introduced by the Co~unity
on 16th March 1982 against the Soviet Union because
- . - ...-"
of deveLopments in Poland , and during the Fa Land
conflict an immediate arms boycott was introduced followed
by an interruption of all trade with Argentina until
the cessation of hostili ties when the restr ictions were again lifted 
Economic sanctions are normally not considered
a very effecti ve- instrument of foreign policy  In a
Leper t prepared by Hans-Joachim Seeler for the Comrni ttee
. on ExternaL Economic Relations (Doc~  1-B3/~~)  it is cLearLy and 
the vi ew of th i s ra~rt eur cor~ct ly stated that the history of
economic sanctions is marked by negative resuLts and that economic
sanctions have generally turned out to be incapable of achieving
foreign policy goals. A similar view has been expressed
by the US Secr~ta~y of State George Shultz, thpugh the
Unit~d States ' poLicy in terms of economic sanctions es;:;eciaLLy
vi~-~-vis the Soviet Union has occasionaLLy turned out to be somewhat
different from that of the Member States of the European CoMunity.
- 44 
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such measures can under cer tain condi tions serve poll ti-
cal purposes  The half-hearted European sanctions vis-
a-vis Iran in 1980 were less an attempt to force Iran
to release the hostages than an act of solidar i ty wi th
the united Stateso It ;s uncertain whether the economic
sanct~ons by the Communi ty towards Argentina had any
significant resuLts on Argentin;an war efforts, but the-potitical a
psychological impact of the sanctions was considerable.
The recent examples of sanctions vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union and Argentina are therefore evidence
of the willingness of the Communi ty Member States to
supper t their foreign policy declarations wi th actions 
The extent to which such actions in the economic sphere
can, in fact, contr ibute to the secur i ty of the Communi-
ty Member States is uncertain~ As an act of solidarity,
a decision by the Ten or a majority of the Ten - as in
the case of the la tter phase of the Falkland conflict 0
i~ may well have consequences wi th a bear ing on the
secur i ty posi tion of the Tene This obviously also
applies to a situation where the united States applies
sanctions and the Member Sta tes of the Communi ty do
not  This has been clear ly and most dr ama tically
illustrated in the case of the gas project from the
Soviet Union to Western Europe 
If European and American views on economic, including
credit, poLicies towards the Soviet Union continue to diverge 
cou Ld have unfortunate repercuss ions for the At Lant i c ALL i ante
and consequently for the secur i ty of Western Europe 
The risk may not be so much that either the united
States or the European members of ~ATO wou l d reappraise
their continued adherence to the Atlantic Pacte The
danger is rather that a deep spli t between the Uni ted
States and Western Europe could change the Soviet per-
ception of the Atlantic Alliance and the Uni ted States 
commi tment to Europe in a way wh; ch cau ld seri ous ly enhance the
threat to Western Europew
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The rise of different peace movements and
of anti-nuclear organizations of one kind or another
has undoubtedly had an impact upon the secur i ty deba te
in Western Europe during the last few years~ It appears
t hat a s a f 1 9 8 1 0 n H a r d s it has ;a par al l e L i n th e
Uni ted Sta tes, al though there is not cotriplete similarity
between the so-called freeze movement in the
Uni ted States and the anti-nuclear movement in Western
Europee The latter colTprises amol1g others
,J the unilateralists who are willing to do away with nuclear weapons on the Western
side in Europe without any previous agreement with the
Soviet Union to ensure that abolition of nuclear weapons
is mutual 
There is no question that the peace movements
. in Europe have had an impact upon governmenb and that
they reflect a considerable segment of public opinion.
.. -. . 
How large and how important is very difficult to 
assess, because the term peace movement is used to cover
var ious groups and movements wi th somewhat different
aims an~ uni ted only in their protests against what
t~ey consider to be a continued arms race ahd, especially,
a continued nuclear arms race 
Some of the peace movements focus on the
planned deployment of Amer ican medium range missiles
from 1983 onwards in order to prevent the decision from
being implemented  Others support unilateral Western
European renunciation of all nuclear weapons and the
thdrawal of all Amer lean nuclear weapons from Europe.
Others advocate a freeze at the present level of nuclear
weapons  Others are directed exclusively against the
Uni ted States under President Reagan and others again
are protesting against both superpowerSa
. -. I  a n a t t e m p t t 0 a n a L y s e  whe~her the rise of t.he
peace movements and anti-nuclear groups is likely 
have a lasting effect upon the conduct of the securi 
policy of all or some of the Communi ty Member States 
he first question to ask is if the current trend will
lead any NATO member state to leave the Atlantic
- 46  PE 80.. 082/fin..- - ... --- -' - --. . - --.- _. . 
Alliance. ~his must be considered very unlikely.
Government declarations and party 
programmes clearly
indicate a preference for the continued existence of
the Atlantic Alliance and those groups almost exclusively
to be found on the extreme left, who want their countries
to leave the Atlantic Alliance are quite obviously a
minor i ty, even a rather small minor ity.
Disagreements are much more discernible when it comes to a definition of how to implement NATO
po  1 i c i e s. Public  opinion polls  r:evea~,  perhaps not qu~ 
unexpectedly, that the major i ty of Europeans are 
favour of NATO and are against a heavy 
reliance on
nuclear weapons for the defence of Western Europe.
At ti~ ~ame t:me only a minod ty is ready to Suppor 
increased defence expenditure, which could strengthen
the conventional defence ~sture and diminish the depend-
ence on nuclear weapons 
It a::ats ~le to" 
~ ~ 
tFe 
~. 
rrOve:rents,  ffi3SE meetings and demonstrations against 
nuclear weapons
notwithstanding  do not offer a clearly defined alter-
native security policy. ~re are obviously strong neutralist currents both wi thin and, to a lesser extent outside the peace movements. Insofar as they advocate alternative policies to continued membership of NATO
they do not seem to favour the establ ishment of  independent Western Europe with its Own armed forces
. The neutralist tendencies seem rather to go hand in hand with paci sm and a widespread, if by no means unanimous view i s that Western Europe shouLd withdraw from unhea l thy mil i ta ry compet i t i on between the two supe r- powers and base its future security on being
- 47 - PE 80.082/fin..more or less disarmed or only lightly armed and certain
ly wi~hout any nuclear weapons on the continent.
However, even the Br i tish Labour Party, which is officialj
ly committed to nuc Lear uni Laterali sm, has no majority in
favour of outright withdrawaL from NATO0
Others who lean towards at least the objectives
of some of the peace movements want to renounce nuclear
. weapons in Western Europe? but advocate at the same time
an increased rearmament to equip Western Europe wi 
. a more credible conventional defence posture to enable
the West to accept a no-first-use of nuclear weapons
doctr ine to w~~9~ the Soviet Union already professes
to adhereo
In some countr ies  and notably in the Nether-
lands, the churches play an important role in the peace
movements  Public opinion polls indicate a widespread
supper t for the large scale peace demonstrations and
especially the oppos i tion agains t the planned deployment
of medium-range m~ssiles 
Public qpinion polls may not be the most
instructi ve guide to the complexi ties of foreign policy
and secur i ty i 55 ues  A s impl i f led ques tion (Are you
for or against nuclear weapons in Europe?) is likely to
provoke an equally simplified reply  However, the
sentiments opposed to a fur ther increase of the nuclear
weapons arsenal are evident, even if they in no way
consti tute a clear-cut al terna ti ve to present secur i ty
policies 
A recent Amer lean Congressional publication
dealing wi th the cr isis in the Atlan~ic Alliance contains
a warning example of how mutual perceptions can take
extreme forms  In Europe, i t ~s said,  much of the media
and certain leaders of the anti-nuclear movement painted
the picture of the Uni ted States gone wild, bound and
determined to confront the Soviet Union led by a reck-
less cowboy wi th six guns at the ready ~ ~ 0 In the Uni ~ed
States, corresponding images character ized the Europeans
as weak-willed pacif ists, duped by Soviet propaganda,
manipulated by the KGB and ready to unfurl the flag of
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surrender at the first sign of trouble 
It wouLd certainLy be premature and probabLy also
unreaLi sti c to view the current trends as an indi cation of ~n
early breakup of the Atlantic Alliance  There seems
Ii ttle likelihood that the secur i ty system which has
existed in Europe for more than ~O years, with the United
States and the Soviet Union both playing vi tal roles
wi thin their respective alliance systems, should cease
to exist or even radically change.
For the purpose of this repor t, it is of
particular interest to note that the present restless-
ness wi th the existing secur i ty system and especially
wi th the role played by nuclear weapons, is not associated
wi th any new plan to give the European Communi ty its
own independent mili tary dimension& Most peace demon-
strators seem unwilling to face the choice of whether
a Europe more independent of the Uni ted States than at
presen t should be armed a t all 
Because EPC must occasionally focus on and
identify areas where European interests are not identi~
cal wi th those of the Uni tea States, EPC does contain
a certain appeal to the neutralist left in Western
Europe, al though the left-wing neutralists usually
view EEC wi th considerable scepticism and are generally
hostile to the idea of an integrated (Western) Europe 
As nine of the ten Member States belong to the Atlantic
Alliance (al though France has been outside the mili tary
arm of NATO since 1966) and have no intention whatsoever
of leaving the Alliance, there is no anti-American bias
buil t into EPC  But in view of the divergent US and
European view8 on a number of economic and even poli tical
issues, such a bias may be perceived by those who would
like to advocate and encourage anti-Americanisn~
1 )
Crisis in the AtLantic ALLiance .. A report
prepared for the Committee on Foreign ReLation~,
US Senate, Washington, March 1982..
- 49 - PE 80..082/fin..Thi s does not by itself crea te the necessary
poli tical condi tions wi thin the Communi ty Member St~tes
for the establishment of a common European defence
enti ty . I t may, however, have an impact upon the
perceptions which will eventually form part of a European
secur 1 ty concept 
There is no need for Western Europe, even in
t ime~ of deep cr isis vis-a-vis the Uni ted States, to
provide a military defence against North America. Only
a tiny minor i ty will allege that the Uni ted Sta tes
consti tutes an armed threat against Western Europe,
- -_-
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-oO  in Western Europe, but if they should continue to grow,
they . a re more like ly t9 lead to 
fragmented Europe than to a united Europe with its own
foreign policy and own defence establishment. In short,
neutralism and pacifism provide no viable alternative
to the present secur i ty concept. of two opposing alli~
ance systems.
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Peop le i mpat i ent wi th the progress of European
integration, amply represented in the European ParLiament, will
samet i mes fee l tempted to ca l L for the revi va L of the European
Defence Community. This is not realistic under present
conditionsu It is also considered highly undesirabLe by many 
A new trea ty set ting up the fr amewor k for a
European defence enti ty would not be signed by all
Member Governments and probably ratified by even fewer.
It would stir new controversies which would harm the
present Communi ty and it could have a paralyzing effect
upon the progress of European poli tical Co-Operation.
This also explains why this report is not
recommending the setting-up at the present time of a
separate commi ttee, or a sub-comrni ttee under the poli-
.. .. 
tical Affair s Commi ttee, to deal wi th secur i ty problems 
Such a procedure couLd i solate security i ssues from th~
for e i 9 n poL; c y con t e x t  her e the y ~e Lon g 
But if the European Communi ty has a future
at all it is inevitable that security and one day even
defence will become part of i to ' The absurdi ty of
building up a European economic and poli tical enti 
and ignor ing forever secur i ty and defence has been
pointed out by many G It was succinctly put by Mr 0 Leo
Tindemans in his far too often overlooked report on a European
Union in 1975 e It has been underlined several times
in debates in the European Parliament long before the
Parliament was directly elected  I t has been clear 
sta ted by the present President of the European Commis-
sion ~ Mr ~ Gas ton Thorn  The Genscher /Colombo ini tia ti 
is directed towards creating a more sa tis factory link
between Communi ty policies and foreign and secur i ty
policies 
It is logical and indeed necessary that securi-
ty considerations are now officially part of the agenda of European Poli tical Co-oper  tion Q I t is also a
fact that increased attention is now being given to the
role in a European industr ial policy to be played by
51 - PE  80.. 0bc.1  I If I..a common European approach to arms development, arms
pr~ur ~nt, arms r esear~, a~ ar~ sales .
However logical the connection between
secur i ty, fore ign policy and Communi ty affairs, talks,
repor ts and bluepr ints do not consti tute the necessary
poli tical basis for building a European defence commu-
ni ty. . I  is this r appor teur v 5 view that it would be
a fundamental error to focus exclusively or even
primar ily on an insti tutional solution to the problem
of integr a ting secur i ty and defence fully into the
affairs of the Communi ty  In fact, as the Communi ty
has developed i t is log i c a l
to assume that a truly integrated European defence
will consti tute the final phase of the whole European
integration processo Few people would dare to set . a
date for the likely achievement of thia goal~
I t is the thrust of this repor t that wi thout
a mill tary dimension, and even wi thout an openly stated
common secor i ty policy, the Communi ty Member States
a~e nevertheless developing a joint secor i ty concept.
Thisgrows out of decisions taken both on a national
level and on a Communi ty level 
A European identi ty is not created simply
by accepting a governmental declaration on the subject as was done
a decade agoG It is being created by an increasing
number of decisions made and atti tudes taken by the
Ten ~ and sometimes more than the Ten - focus ing 
those elements which are uniquely European  The more
European decisions and atti tudes, the more substantive
will be the European identi ty and subsequ~ntly the
corresponding European secor i ty concept.
1) 
This is the principal topic of the forthcoming Fergusson report
for the Political Affairs CommitteeD See also the speech by
Mr ~ Chri stopher Tugendhat, Vi ce-Pres i dent of the Commi ss;on,
on May 14, 1981 on the Comrrunity dimension to Europe s defence.
- 52 PE 80. 082/fin..Thi s process i s forced upon the Community
by poli cal and economi c deveLopments in the world,
by new and exi sting trade patterns, by avai labi lity
of resources and by many other factors.
It i s being made increasingly c lear
that European countries have a growing number of iden-
cal interests. It i s also clearer today than before
that these interests are not always identi cal with
those of the United States, the principal guarantor
of European security.
Thi s does not mean that diverging security
interests wi I lead to th~ breakup of the Atlanti
anceo If that. happened, it would be only 
a s a re s u L t 0 f m i s c aLe u l at ion 0 n e i the r s i de 0 f the
lantic. The more that common European interests
are identified and perceived, the more effectively
they can be managed.
The Atlanti c security link can therefore
be handled more confident ly, both when the sharing 
interests between North Ameri ca and Western Europe
can lead to joint or paraL lel actions and poli es,
and when recognizably di fferent Ameri can and European
interests requi re di fferent actions and poli cies
executed with the understanding that the security
relationship need not, indeed should not, be fatal
harmedo
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SUMMARY OF MINORITY OPINION IN THE COMMITTEE BY THE RAPPORTEUR, PURSUANT TO
RULE 100 , PARAGRAPH 4
When the report was put to a vote in the Political Affairs
Committee, there were 33 votes in favour? 5 against and 4 abstentions~
It is not possibLe to summarise jointly the views of those who
either voted against or abstained, because their views differed and
their motives varied& Mrs" Hammerich Cof the Group for Technical
Co-ordination) found the report to be in violation of the Rome Treaty
and dangerous from the point of view of peace in Europe and in the
worLd, paragraph 5 being the most dangerous paragraph.
Mr Capanna , an aLternate Member from the same Group,
saw the report as contributing to a European security community with
the inevitable resuLt of bringing about a miLitary industrial complex
within the Community. This could Lead to ; adventurous miLitary interventions
by the Community outside Europe.
Mr Balfe , of the SociaList Group, voted against because the
report was in contradict"ion to the position taken by his party, the
Labour Party, on uni Latera L nuc Lear di sarmament.
Mr Ephremidis , of the Communist Group, considered the report to
be in violation of the Treat Yo He has found severaL imprecise formuLations in
the explanatory statement~
Mr Kyrkos, of the Communist Group, whi le recognls1ng the
vaLidity of many parts of the report , took exception to its poLiticaL
Line , which was contrary to his own political beliefs=
Mr PLaskovitis , of the SociaList Group, could support many
parts of the report , but was dissatisfied with the Rapporteur s unwiLlingness
to give explicit attention to the special position of certain Member countries,
poLiticalLy and geographicaLLy~
Mrs. van den HeuveL , of the Socialist Group, expressed herself
1 n f a v 0 u r of s eve r aL art S 0 f the r e po r t , b LI t too k ex c e p t ion to p a rag rap h 5
and consequentLy abstained in the final voteD
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THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION
. - - - _
12 Dec~rnber 1979
Special Meeting of fnre~gp. a)Hi Defence (\:1 inisters
Brussels (1
Chairnuln: l'vf r. .I. Luns.
Quantitative and qua/iiarive hnprO\.'cN1t?n!S to Sovic! lo!/~ range nuclear capability
/v/odernizalion and cxpa!1sivn of Soviei LVf  Parane! ('ourses oj T,VF rlloderni-
zatiol1 and QrtNS control  E t1.ropean defiloyrnerH 0/ US ground-launched systems 
Withdrawal of lOGO US nucl~(Jt \f(lfheads  Proposed Inclusion oj US and Soviet
long range theatre nuclear sysfenL in anns. CO/1tro! e//ofls  Special high level
consul/alive body on ,.,eg~)liarions j'l  the field of Ofl115 limitations.
1. At a speciai rneeling of Foreign and Defence f\1inisters in Brussels on 12th
December 1979:
2 - Ministers recalled the f\tfay 1978 Su mmtt ,,'!here governments expressed the
political resolve to nlcet the cha!l121!g:,:S to their s~curjty posed by the continuing
momentUtl1 of the \VarsJvJ Pa...:i rnilitary build-up.
. -. .-- - ..--
3. The Vvarsaw Pact 11:.\5 over the years devclo~d a large anu growing capa-
bility in nuclear systems that dirl~(tly thre;,~fcn Vv\:st;:-rn  Europ,~ and have a
strategic significance for the Alliance in Eurof)'.? This situation has been espe-
cially aggravated over the . hs'f few years by Soviet drcisioflS to in1plcnlcnt
prograOHTICS modernizing (loll cKp~\ndlng their !ong-r;,mgc nudcar clpabilily
substantially. !n rartlcu!ar? they havt~ l:,:PI()ycd the SS-20 nli~;silc. which .()rrcr
significant improvcrncnts over prCVJUUS ~ystenlS in providing greater ac.:curacy.
more mobility. and greater range. ;j:~ wen tiS having fnultipk warheads. and the
Backfire bornber. V,,' h id"! has a n,u ~h belt~~r performance t olher Soviet
aircraf\ deployed hitherto in ~ lhc~Hrc nOlic. During this period. while the Soviet
Union has been ~elnforcing tts su~.::tiorIi.Y in Long Range Theatre Nuclear
Forces n..RTNF) both quaoliLJtivcly and qudlitati\icly, \Vestern LRTNF capabil-
ities have rcn\ained static. lndtcd theSt2 forcts are io(;rcasing in age and vulner-
ability a:1d do not Include land-based" long-range the2.tre nuclear missile sys-
tems.
- - --
4. At the sarnc tinle. the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and
expansion of their shorter~range Tf\IF 2nd greatly improved the overall quality
of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the back-
ground of increasing ~)vjet inter-(:ontinentai capC!.bilrties and achievement of
parity in intcr-continenta! (,,!pability 'A ;th the United States.
5. These ((ends ha'iC pro!llpted serioLs concern witrin the Alliance, because. 
they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could
undern1ifiC the si2biJity achieved in intcr~continental systems and cast doubt on
the credibility of the Alliance s deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the
spectru m of NATO's a vailable nuclear response to aggression.
6. fVlinisters noted that these recent dcveloprnents require concrete a\:tions on
the part of thr: Alliance if NA T(Ys stfc'.legy of flexible  response is to remain
e) France did no! participate in the Spcciai tifteetiPg.
~~ 60  PE 80~O82/Ann lIltinGcredible. After intensive consideration, including the n,erits of alternative
a~proaches, and after taking note of the positions or certain n1Ct11bers, lviinistcrs
concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance auld best be served by
pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization
and arms controL 
7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the
deployment in Europe of US ground"launchcd systems comprising 108 Pershing II
launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I~A, and 464 Ground
launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations
currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the
programme: the missiles will be stationed in selectcd countries and certain
support costs will be met through NATO's existing cornman funding arrange-
ments. The prograolme will not increase NA TO' s reliance upon nuclear \~iea.
pons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral p:'1ft of TNF
modernization. 1.000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe 
soon as feasible. Further. fvtinisters decided that the 572 LRTNF warh~ads
should be accon1modated within that reduced level. which necessarily imrlies a
numeri(.:,tl shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other
types and shorter ranges. In addition they not~d with sJtisbction that the
Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an exao1ination of the precise nature.
scope and basis of the adjustrnents resulting frorn the LRTI'Jf dcptoynlcfH and
their po:-;sible implications for the  balance of roles and SYStCO1S in j\, AT(rs
nuclear armoury as a whole. This cxamin.llion win form the basis of a substan.
tive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of i9g0.
8. fviinislers attach grear Importanccto the rOTc- T~grm - coritf'oi in contributing
to a more stable milittuy relationship bet\Neen East and V';cst and in advancing
the proces~ of detente. This is reflected in  il  broad set of initiatives being
examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and detente
in the 19805. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the /\l1iancc
efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make
the strategic situation between East and 'Nest rnore stable, more predictable,
and more rnanageable at lower tevels of arrnarnerHs on both sides. In this regard
they welcorne the contribution which the SALT if Treaty IT1akes to\vi.uds
achieving these objectives.
9. fViinisters consider that, building on this accomplishrnent and taking
account of the expansion of Soviet LRT;..JF capabilities of concern to l~lA TO,
arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overaH nuclear balance at  Javier
levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain
US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systerns- This would reflect previous
VI/estern suggestions to include such So\'ie~ and US systems in arrns control
negotiations and more recent expressions by  50v  iet President Brezhnev of
willingness to do so. !vfinisters fully support the decision taken by the United
States following consultations within the AHiance --to negotiate arms Iirllitations
on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR  to  begin negotiations as soon 
possible along the following tines which have been elaborated in intensive
consultations within the All lance : 
A. Any future limitations on US systerns principaHy designed for theatre
missions should be acconlpanied  by  appropriate Hmitations on Soviet theatre
svstems.
~ 6  r:H"  1 Ii n ')  I r . ~ C O~f .. U () L  n n "
! -
r 1 n -B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SAt T III framework in a step-by-step approach.
C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establish- ment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre
nuclear missile systems.
D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the
principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of .de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.
E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.
10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security
of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted
within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in
other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.
II. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complenten-
tary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and
defence and thus maintain the security of Its member States.
A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO' s deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible
response to unilateral Soviet TNF deploynlents, and to provide the foundation
for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.
B. Success of arms control in -constraining the- Soviet buiId~up can--enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO' s TNF requirements, and promote
stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence ano- nte aserfuIiciateo iffLhe -Harmel Report. NATO' TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through .negotiations.
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tabLed by Mr Schall, Mr Lucker, Mr Klepsch , Mr Vergeer, Mr von HasseL , Mr Adonnino,
Mrs Gaiotti de Biase, Mr Janssen van Raay, Mr Penders , Mr PfLimLin, Mr d' Ormesson
Mr Herman, Mr Fischbach and Mr Pottering
on behaLf of the Group of the European People
pursuant to Ru Le 25 of the Ru les of Procedure
Party (Christian Democrat Group)
on European poL iticaL cooperation on matters of security poL icy
The Euro~n Parliament
- conSC1OUS of its responsibili ty to the ci tizens of Europe on all
issues of vital importance to Europe,
- aware of the role which the European Community must play and of the
need for it to make a significant contribution to international peace,
- aware of the disturbing increase in the level of armaments, which
Iso imposes ser ious burdens on the developing countries,
- conscious of the commi tment to sa feguard human rights, which 
inseparable from the commi tment to the securi ty and independence
of nations,
- aware of the need to guarantee the security of shipping routes and
in ternationa 1 trade in the interests of the economy of Europe and
of all nations,
- deeply concerned at the grave internationa 1 political situation,
- having regard to the worrying fact that the invasion of Afghanistan
and the bruta 1 Soviet repression has remained  fait accompli 
despite condemnations from all over the world and the brave resistance
of the Afghan people 
- having regard to the instability of the international political
situation  in which major economic and social disparities and the
!4hdrp inCrGC1Se in areas of tension may provide opportunities for
or provoke mi Ii tary adventures,
- whereas the present situation dangerously weakens the prospects
for disarmament and makes it m~ e difficult to achieve the necessary
reduction in nuclear arsena Is,
- aware of the fact that the growing concentration on military
expendi ture in the industr
- . 
'-'r  c.I  1.,- dE. 
(, 
loping cour tr ~~e s a Ii ke
intcnsi ties the 1nliJd .af1ce .
.. 
tht::\ 'T
'":",
::-ld economy and l.ncreases the
risk of tep~i/~
L\\lr:inced that detente is indivisible and inevitably depends on our
collntrics takinQ joint coorJi.nated measures to deter any aggression,
- 63 - PE 80u O82/AnnQ III/finus~~ongly urges the Member States of the Community to include in
their sphere of responsibility and in the context of political
cooperation all aspects of the serious threat to world peace and
the security of the nations of Europe as well a.s that of the more
directly threatened countries of the Middle East posed by the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and to take the necessary steps
to guarantee international peace and the security of the nations
of Europe;
Instructs its Political Affairs Committee to submit to Parliament
a report on security and defence questions based on the following
political premises:
- the realization that there is no alternative to the political and
military alliance between the United States and Europe - an alliance
which has in the past provided and still provides a guarantee for
international peace and security and which has demonstrated its
peaceful, defensive and democratic nature over the past 30 years -
and that complete solidarity with the United states is therefore
compatible in this respect with a joint European initiative;
- support for all political moves that genuinely aim at securing
arms limitation subject to controls, an important contribution to
the protection of nations and the progress of detente;
- intensification of political and economic cooperation with the
Third World and increased support for countries particularly hard
hi t by current developments 
- support for the Western European Union and its Parliamentary
Assembly, which are responsible for arms policy and arms control,
and for the efforts of tre Atlantic community in security matters 
3 . Instructs its President to forward this resolution to 
the Council,
the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the
governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Commission
of the European Communities.
- 64 - PE 80.082/Ann.III/fin.MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-30/81)
tabled by Mr Lomas, Mr Seal , Mr Caborn, Mr Megahy
pursuant to Ru le 25 of the Ru leg of Procedure
on peace and detente
The Euroeean Parliament
- notes the constructive proposals made by President Brezhnev
in his spee~ to the Congress of the ~~unist Party of the
Sov iet Union,
- notes particularly the following proposals:-
the calling of a Special Session of the Security Council
of the United Nations with the participation of top 
leaders of Member States and other states to look for 
solutions
to prevent wa r ,
the hOlding of Soviet/~ited States talks at ~e highest level,
agreed advance notification of military exerc~ses 
in the
whole of the European USSR wi th corresponding extensions by the West,
concrete ne~tiations for Far East confidence building measures,
an international agreement on ~e Persian Gulf  ~i&  could be discussed a~~ ~~ ~e i~e~t~~l a~ct of A~anist~.
Calls upon the Governments of all Member 
St ates and the
United States to respond PO&tively to these proposals and
to make genuine efforts to improve detente and cooperation
in Europe and the world 
Instructs the President to forward 
this resolution to the
Governments of the Member States and to the Government of the
United States 
- 65 -
ANNEX IV
PE 80~ O82/Ann~ IV/fin&ANNEX V
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. -1-497/81)
. ,
tabled by Mr Schal l, Mr Pedini, Mr d' Ormesson, Mr von Hasse~, ~r, Janssen van Raay,
Mr Fi schbach, Mr Herman
on behalf of the Group of the European people s Party (Chri~t;an-Democrat;c Group)
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of: Procedure
on the two-part NATO decision
~)e Eur9~n Parliamen~
- conscious of its responsibili ty as a directly-elected :parli~ent' for
the security of the European partner states" 
huving regard the military superiority of t11e WARSAW PAc'r ower 'N1\"'O,
. ;,
pur ticular 1y follcw ing the in traduction of "Soviet nUCl('~11" t.l:ac;'i\;tr\'"
weapons, against- which NATO has nothing comparabl~' to offer as 
. .
deterrent, .
, . ~ ;- , ,
- recognizing that the measures decided upon in December 1~7~ bY the
supreme NATO bodies to modernize their Euro-strategic' weapons ,and at 
the sante time to offer to negotiate on diFJarm:amen" represent, ,li"
de~isi.on of fundamental importan~e~ ,particula111y for the se:~ut.i;t.y ,
the European par tner s ta tea ~
:"  , !
- having rc'gard to the deci SlOPS by the
the  t~o-part NATO decision , albei t on
European' governments to _-dhere to
; .
t. ,
cer tain condi tions. i~),sOme 'cases..
" - : ' ' ;/, \.  ' ;.
- convinced that detente, the security of the natiobs of Europe and mutual
balanced disarmament talks between East and West in. future will 
centrally and fundamentally dependent on this decision,
- having regard to the waVe of propaganda and efforts to create ( con.fusion
. ., \ 
directed primarily at the European, partner states by the Soviet UnLon
~, 
and to the threats of various political" activities by the Soviet :
Government designed to prevent NATO moderni.zatiofi following tn~
. '
previous unilateral arms build-up by the WARSAW PACT and to ri~in9 about
the cancellation of, the NATO two-part deci~ion#
- concerned at the growing influence no~1 being e:(crtcd on sec'urity i'ss\.1es
in large areas of public opinion by emotio~s aroused by pOll tical
parties and the lnedia, which is in line \'1ith and furthers Sovi~t
security strategy and is likely to weaken the. consensus, among the
European member s of NArro and encourage oppos:i.;tion to Uni ted 'States
securi ty policy.
Reaffirms, in the light of the security interests and the desire of
the na ti on s of Europe for peace, de ten te and mu tually balanced
disarrrament:, the necessi ty of modernization in the field of Euro-
strategic weapons as an essential counterdeterrent and simul-
taneously and independen tly thereof an immedia te resumption of dipar-
mamen t. ta lks ;
- 66 - PE 80.082/AnnmV/fin.Repudiates the threats issued by the 'Soviet Government -
European members of NATO and the Europ~an pUblic as gross
ference in th~rnost important sphere of sovereign states'
affairs;
indi vidual
in ter-
, :
:Ln terna l
Calls upon and encourages the national 'governments of the alij.ed.
European states, the Council ~nd NATO, 
- to adhere unconditionally t~ the- tw()"-pal"t !'-JA'IQ  dt"cision and
thus ensur(~ t,he securi ty 01 l~uropc and
- to counter one-sided Soviet propaganda. by providing more
information to clarify the security is-sues involved and " explain
these mar' e clear 11" to ~he public:
Instructs the Pre 51. dent of the European Parliament to forward this.
resolution to the NATO Supreme Command, the CoUncil, the Commission,
...
the national governments of the Member States arid to bring 1t tQ 
tile a t ten tion of the European public.
- 67 - PE BO.O82/Ann.V/fin.MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-700/81)
tabled by Mr Efremidis, Mr Adamo~:and Mr Alavanos
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
ANNEX VI
on the European par l i ament' s support for the Member State$ of' the EEC n their
endeavours for peace
~e 
-. ~!~~-
E~! l:'.~;.l~ C?-m~n
~therear) the 1982 draft preliminary budget of the European 
Cc~~un1 ties now under discussion includes expend! ture on
research in the nuclear sector,
- whereas proposals have recently been made seeking systematic-
ally to develop the European Conununi ties into a mili tary
Com."'nuni ty (Genscher proposals), to bui Id up the EEC t s naval
power (decision of the Political Affairs Committee) and to
encourage the European Communities to play an active role
wi thin the framework of the dangerous cold war policy of
: -
the USA ~nd NATO (Conuniss!oner Tugendhat' s statements) 
whereas the problem of European securi ty -has now reached an
extremely cr1 tical point, particularly following the de-
cision to base Pershing II and Cruise nuclear missiles in
member countries of NATO, and in the light of the production
of the nett tron bomb by- .the USA and the promo tion of plans
to develop it in the Member States of the EEC following
the statements by American officials on limited nuclear war,
\-lh~!reas all the conntries of West(~rn Europe are in ferment
in an unprecedentedly powerful mass, movement against nuclear
weapons and the neutron bomb that ewbraces the peoples of
all our countries regardless of political persuasion,
, .
- whereas the European Parliament, which is elected by direct
universal. suffrage  cannot ignore the foremost problem con-
cerning the peoples of our countr~eS
Resol yes
1 . To express its support for the peoples of Wes tern Europe
in their endeavours to remove the nuclear threat, to promote
d~tente and to bring about -a reductj.on in the ,level of
. arm~rnents" fully sharing their deep anxiety for the future
of peAce in Europe;
- 68 ~ PE 80. 082/ Ann. V  If; nofJ.'o. eXtpr~s$" -moat: ~~t. C:.al;Ly its, opposition to:
'" 
the a9pir~t~on$
and propOsal. ~f le~ders o~ the European Commun~ ties s~,kin~
to brinq about the open involvement of the EEC in the USA!:
cold war pol icy and to convert it in to a European branch
of NA'L'O 
To examine with special dare the allocation .of appropr1a~ions
in the 1982 draft budget and to delete thQse directly '
indirectly connected with. military ai~, particularly .in the
nuclear sector, ,
To de~ lare itself .in favour of the immediate opening of
negotiations to achieve a balance at the lowest l~ssible
level, as a decisive step in the process of mutual, controlled
disarmament; .
Inst~uctB its President to forward this resolution to the
Commission, the Council and the.! Gcvernmerits of the l-lember 4-  States. 
- 69 - PE 80.082/Ann.VI/fin.ANNEX V I 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC.1"'760/81)
tabled by Mrs Gaiotti de Biase, Mr Klepsch, Mr Vergeer, Mr Simonnet, Mr Herman,
Mr L ;gios, Mr Macario, Mr Ghergo and Mr Fi schbach
on behal f of the Group of the Europeap People s Party (CD Group)
wi th request for topi ca l and ur~ent ~ebate pursuant tb Rule 4a of the .Ru Les of Procedure
an ba lanced and cont rolled di sarm~tnent
:~' ~__.
;1I !2P(\(1 n Pi1r 1 i an
- ~1ereas the Geneva arms negotiations open on 30 November 1981,
cc,nsidering that, by launching their political initiative, European
" .
Ii  governments helped to pave the way for .these negotiations,
- reaffirming  its  own commi tment to peace, being taken to mean
(...l) complete openness to nc(jotiatibn und dialogue '
(b) searching for means to establish mutual trust,
(c) economic cooperation and balanced development amongst. all" the peoples
of the war ld,
(d) furtherance of democracy and human rights,
aware of the duty of a parliament elected by universal sulrrage
represent the hopes and aspirations, 'of all European peoples for ..peace ,
clware of the need for the principles of HelsInki .to pe reapplied in 
a coherent manner so that, for exampl~  Afghanista~ regains self-
determination and the sit.uation in Pola'nd  is'  allowed, to de~e.lop
, '
peacefully wi thout interference,
. " , '
1 . Requests the governments of the powe~& taking part in thE=: ,arn\s
ncgotiat ions beginning on" 30 NovemiSer 1981 to  pursue 'wi th ,the. \itmos't 
determination the objective of ,a balanced en d controlled reduction
. "
of nuclear and conventional weapons to the lo'\'est possible levelr
- , - \ " " -.- ; " , '  ~, 
I F;~
Calls on the President of the Cpuncil and the governments of the
Member States to engage in transparent and concerted poli tical
?operation to be able to bring d~e infl~ence to bear in the
defence of European interests in the cause of peace and security
, . ,
withi!1 the framework of the Atlantic alliance and 6f ~alanced and
/. .
controlled disarmament 
" " .
3 . Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council'
and commission..
- 70 - PE 80. 082/ Ann B V I 1/ f i n.ANNEX VIII
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-766/81)
. . . , . . . ' , ~ ' . )
tabled by Mrs Lizin, Mr Boyes, Mrs Baduel-Glorioso, Mrs Castell;na, Mrs C;nciari-Rodano,
Mr Michel, Mr Capanna, Mrs Clwyd, Mrs Ewing, Mr Balfe, Mr Vandemeulebroucke, Mr Griffiths
Ms Quin, Mr Lomas, Mr Hume, Mr Ceravolo, Mr Ferrero, Mr Vitale, Mr Papapietro, Mr Bonacini,
Mr de Goede, Mr Eisma, Mr Veronesi , Mr Kyrkos
wi th request for urgent and topi ca l debate
pursuant to Ru le 48
on peace in Europe
. 'l'he  Buro o(,an Par  ioJt~A~,
'--'-----
recalling the deep attachment to peace of the peoples in Europe:
noting that recently, in Bonn, Rome, London, Brussels, paris,
Ar:\sterJam and other cities, well over a million p~ople have demonstrated
aga inst Europe becoming the battleground of a nu~lear conflict:
concerned that while resources are wasted on nuclear weaponry, the
pressing needs of econonlic and social cleve) opment in the third world
are inadequately met;
not.ing that negotiations are due to start on November 30 between the
Uni tea States and the Soviet Union about arms reductions 
1 .. C&lls on the negotiations to take account of the wishes of the
people of Eur0pe, who
reject the installation of new NATO medium-range missiles on European
soil:
seek the dismantling of similar missiles installed by the Soviet Union:
rej ect the deplo~~ent of neutron bombs in Europe;
v:ant gradual elimination of all nuclear weapo'ns in Europe:
Urges that every effort be made to proreote world peace;
Calls :)n its Presidept to transmit this resolution to the Commission..
the Council, the governments of the Member States, of all other
European Sta tes, and of the USSR and the USA. .
71 - PE 80.082/Ann.VIII/fin.MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC . 1-904/81)
tabled by Mr GL inne, Mr Jaquet, Mr G. Fuchs, Mr Hansch, Mr van
Mrs Focke, Mr Zagari , Mr CarigL ia, Mr Dido ' and Mr J. Moreau
on behalf of the SociaList Group
pursuant to RuLe 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the USA-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva
The Euroeean Parliament
- having noted the recent statements as to the possibility of 1
nuc lear war in Europe,
- having regard to the deployment of Soviet 58 20 missiles,
- having regard to the danger of Pershing II and cruise missile
installed by, way of retaliation,
Reaffirms that disarmament, non-use of force and recourse 
international arbi tration must continue to be the guiding
principles of all responsible political action;
2 . Expresses the wish that the negotiations between the USA an
USSR wnich resumed on 30 November should have as their obje
a reduction of armaments and tension in Europe and lead to 
and simultaneous disarmament guaranteeing the security of e
nation and its right to self-determination;
Expresses its resolve to press for the necessary balance of
to be achieved in Europe at the lowest level, by the disman
of 5S  20  .missiles together with the non-installation of Per
and cra16e' missiles, and by endeavouring also to achieve a 
- at th~ lowest level - of all medium-range nuclear weapon
in Europe;
4 . Endorses moreover the aim of the total abolition of medium-
nuclear weapons in Central Europe;
Considers that the success of the disarmament negotiations
of both nuclear and conventional weapons presupposes the at'
of an overall balance of for.ces, of such a kind that nei the:
gain advantage over the other;
Wishes the European Parliament to follow the progress of thl
~~Qotiations staqe bv staqe and to adopt a pos~ tion in the 
of the concerns expressed above;
- 72 -7 . Expresses finally its sympathy wi th the attitude of the hundreds of
thousands of men and women who recently 
underlined, by their
demonstrations, the fact that the maintenance of peace 
is the prerequisite for social well-being and 
who, in their vast majority, are moti vated by the desire to safeguard 
peace and strengthen under-
standing between peoples through a resumption of the East-West 
dialogue and intensification of the North-South dialogue;
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign
r1inisters of the Ten meeting in Political Cooperation and to the
Counc  i 1  and the Cornmi  s s ion.
- 73 - PE 80. 082/Ann. IX/fin.ANNL X 
.....
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCe  1-784/81)
tabled by Mr van Aersseni Mr Klepsch, Mr von Hassel
, Mr Giavaz7i, Mr d' Orp~,nn
Mr Pe~rs, Mr Her~n, Mr Aigner, Mr Habsbur~ Mr ~rs~i
, ~ 
stmi~t, Mr Beumer
Mr Katzer, Mr Es tgen" Mr Adonn; no, Mr Lemmer" Mr de Keersrnaeker , Mr de L D'uca,
Mr Desch~s, Mr Hoffman, Mr Brok, Mr Not~bo~,  Gher~, Mrs Cassa~~~D Cerretti
Mr DockLet, on behaLf of the Group of the European People s Party
for entry in regi ster
pursuant to RuLe 49 of the RuLes of Procedure
on the vioLation of. Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine
Jhe European Par ~ iament
- deeply shocked by the news of the presence of a Sov iet submar ine,
equipped with nuclear weapons, intercepted and boarded in Swedish
territorial waters 
1 Q Condemns this violation of international law, of the sovereignty
of a neutral state and of the Helsinki Final Act ~lich was also
signed by the USSR;
2 Q Notes that the Swedish author i ties have expressed the fear that
the Soviet submarine had released nuclear mines in the surrounding
waters:
3 ~ Expresses its sympathy to the Swedish people and government and
its admiration for their resolute attitude in this situation;
4.. Considers that this unfriendly act by the USSR is. inconsistent
with its own proposals to denuclearize the Arctic and Baltic waters;
5.. Demands that the negotiations which are about to commence jn Genp.T.=\
and which concern a mutual reduction to the lowest possible level
of European strategic nuclear weapons should be entered into in a
spirit of sincerity and mutual honesty, which presupposes th~~ thp
iDe ident which took place in Sweden cannot be repeated under any
c ircums tances:
6", Instructs its President to forward this resolution to t~a Foreign
Iv1inisters of the ten J:v1ember States of the Communi ty meeting 
political cooperation and the Swedish, Soviet and United States
Governmen ts 
- 74 - PE 80.08?/Ann" X/fin~.- ~._.- .
NNEX X I
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC~ 1-268/82)
tabLed by Mr Ephredemi 5 , Mr Adamou, Mr Alavanos, ~ir lomas, Mr Boyes, Mr BaLfe
Mrs C Lwyd, Mr Megahy, Mr Caborn, Mr van Mi nnen and Mr Sea 
Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the second UN SpeciaL Session on Disarmament
'rhe Eur91~~~ )?afl~fl'! 
whereas the second ON Special Session on Disarmament \~il1 be held in June;
13 . ilwt\re that.  particularly over the last. few foonths ~ new clements of inter-
national tension have built up which t.hreaten v-Jorld peace more than ever
before;
c.. cons i o.er ing that the enormous expencli ture on
weapons, the production of the neutron tam;
syst~ms  the promotion of plans for cherrical
arms, particularly nuclear
the deployrnent of new weapons
and other weapons of mass
destruction, the use of and threat to use the 
food weapon ; and the intensi-
fication  of the clD~te of war  are matters of grave concern to the peoples
of the world and threa'ten the hliL~\3n race wi-th extinction;
considering that peace is the CcmITon heritage of all n~~ind, that there
is no al ternati ve and thac 1 consequently f its defence is both the duty of
all peoples and all governments ~!d also a basic human right;
considering that peace can be n~intained and strengthened by halting .the
anTIS racer reducing military expenditure and by encouraging disCh.-mament:
F (# reCC'Ajnlzlng the close link for all conotr..ies bet\AJeen disarmament and inter-
national security u the economic ~1d social developn~nt of nations and the
establishment of a. ne\v world economic order 
whereas these considerations carry particular weigh't for Europe, 'Where
there already exists the grea~'cest concen"tration of nuclear weapons and
'dhere plans are being advanced for the installation of new weapon systems
(Pershing I I; Cruise  neutron bon-b) d l\Thile the doctrines of ' limi ted nuclear
war' and  first striJ(e ~ on European territory are being put for\.;ardi
H.. recognlZlng LDe lITgent need for the cancellation of these plans and for
action to reduce the nuclear arsenal 'to 'b~e lovvest possible level with a
view to the coHIL-?lete rerroval of all ~Jeapons of rnass d.estruction fran the
European continent 
- ?5 - PE 80" O82/AnnoXI/findrecalling that at the first UN special Session on 
DtsClrman1?!i1. 111  19.n~.
the Member States of the United Nations, including the 
Mr?!l\ber StJ~tes
of the EOC, resolved to take action in favour of 
disaxmarrent as the
only solut~on for the survival of mankind;
1.. CALLS ON:
the Men:ber States to contribute with all means at their dispos;\l
to the success of the second UN Spec 
ial Sass ion on Disarmament;
the governments of the Member States, who approved the declarat-ions
in the final document of the first Special Session in 
1978, to
rreet the obI igations en'tered into;
the governments of the Member states to take all necessary steps
- ~ 
ramo, te~visioo etc. - to infom ~ir poopl~s cl  ~~rs
' ,
arising from the production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction  and of the benefits of a pol icy of arms reduction
and disarmament;
the governments of  Member States to respond positively to the
desire of their people for disarmament expressed in pacifist d5non-
str ations :
2 to Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of the
European Carmmi ties, the governrrents of the Member States and to the
Secretary-Gener al of the UN 
- 76 - PE 80~ O82/Ann~ XI/finB